

THE
CONDUCT

3

9.

Of the Late
ADMINISTRATION,

With regard to
FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
from 1722 to 1742,

Wherein that of the
Right Hon^{ble} the Earl of ORFORD
(late Sir ROBERT WALPOLE) *K*

Is PARTICULARLY VINDICATED:

IN A
LETTER

To a certain
Right Honourable GENTLEMAN,
Member of the present Parliament,

*Naturaliter audita visis laudamus libentius; & præ-
sentia invidia, præterita veneratione prosequimur :
& his non obrui, illis instrui credimus.*

VELL. PATERC. lib. 2.

L O N D O N :

Printed for T. COOPER at the Globe in Pater-noster-
Row. 1742. Price 1 s. 6 d.

THE
SECOND
OF THE
ADMINISTRATION

FOR HIGH AFFAIRS
FROM 1722 to 1742

RETTED

Member of the present Parliament.

P
THW
me
ing the
much too
be publi
divide i
Publica
Reader's
his Infor
so metho
him to h
Idea of
ing toge
of it, un
is that C
ters aga
guilty of
mislead
file Vier
actness,
thod the
He be
as they b

PREFACE.

THE following Sheets were part of a larger Work, which included all our material domestic as well as foreign Transactions during the late Administration; but it being found much too voluminous (in the Pamphlet-way) to be published together, it was thought proper to divide it. In this Division, the Conveniency of Publication was not so much regarded, as the Reader's Satisfaction, and I might have added his Information also. For let an Author be ever so methodical, it would be morally impossible for him to have convey'd to the Reader so clear an Idea of a twenty Years Administration, by blending together, as by separating the Transactions of it, under proper and distinct Heads. Thus is that Confusion avoided, which most of the Writers against the late Administration have been guilty of, I am afraid designedly, to puzzle and mislead their Readers. But this Author, whose sole View is to inform with Clearness and Exactness, thought himself obliged to observe a Method the least liable to this Objection.

He begins with our foreign Affairs, not only as they have been first and most inveigh'd against

by the Craftsmen, but as they have, in great Measure, been productive of many of our most material domestic Transactions during the late Administration. And that the bulk of Readers, who are often but too easily imposed upon by artful Declamations, may be able to judge for themselves, he has scrupulously avoided all Unfairness, Gloss and Disingenuity, contenting himself with a fair and plain Narrative of the Facts as they happened, of the Circumstances of Times and Things, and the obvious Reasons and Motives for the Measures taken. For as he was always of Opinion that the Prejudice of the Public to the late Ministry, or Minister, arose chiefly from wrong Information, he believed himself bound in Duty to the first, as well as in Justice to the latter, to state the National Conduct in the plainest and easiest Manner possible, believing that Art and Subterfuge, by which the People were misled, and the Ministry were misrepresented, ought to have been avoided by one whose Intention was to set the one right by producing the other without Veil or Disguise.

The late Ministry, or Minister, wanted but to be perfectly known in order to be more popular. For this Reason, the Craftsmen were uncommonly industrious and assiduous to misrepresent their Actions and Intentions. Had the People been left to judge for themselves, they would have been as warm in the Interest of the Ministry, as they were cool upon them, from a constant artful Abuse of their Persons, and Misrepresentation of
their

their C
could n
than b
Dress,
tisfy'd
that th
may be
known.

The
Time,
ginning
the un
Height
chief A
ple's M
Passion
as they
Wisher
that Ca
succeede
for hop
be hear
is hopea
Indulge
ly, he w
to each
that ma
leges, de
The
served
that it
View, w

P R E F A C E.

their Conduct. Our Author therefore thought he could not do a more good-natured Service to both, than by stating Facts in their naked, genuine Dress, not questioning but the People will be satisfy'd when once they are truly informed, and that the Ministry will be as much loved, as they may have been disliked, when they are truly known.

The Author has had this Work by him for some Time, and intended to have published it the beginning of January last; but was prevented by the unhappy Ferment grown to an uncommon Height about that Time. As Concord was his chief Aim, he could not hope to succeed till People's Minds should be less inflamed. Men in Passion never see Things as coolly and distinctly as they ought; and seldom hear, even their best Wishers, with Temper or Patience. But now that Calm and Moderation has, or ought to have succeeded Tempest and Conquest, there are Grounds for hoping that Truth may be spoken, and will be heard with Coolness; and let me add, that it is hoped this Truth will be heard not only with Indulgence, but with Acknowledgement also. Surely, he who endeavours to reconcile a divided People to each other, and the People to a Government that maintains them in their Rights and Privileges, deserves the Thanks of the Public.

The Temper and Decency of Expression observed throughout this whole Piece, is a Proof that it was calculated for Concord and Union; a View, which could not be imputed to those whose
Writ-

Writings for many Years past, were obviously designed to divide and disunite the Nation. If the Gentleman, to whom it is inscribed, be freely expostulated with in some few Places, on account of his Separation from his old Friends, and associating with some suspected of Indifferency at least to the Government, 'tis hoped the Public will excuse it; 'tis hoped he himself will excuse a Freedom expressed not only with Tenderness, but with Decency, and even with Deference. There is another Reason why that Gentleman should excuse the Liberty taken with him; and that is, that it comes from a friendly Hand; from one who formerly rever'd him for his Candour, good Sense, Principle and Politeness; and who still esteems him for his Discernment and Moderation.

The Author's Stile and Manner of Writing plainly shews him to be little versed in the modern Art of making the most of a bad Cause. Had that which he undertakes to defend been such, he would not have attempted it, being conscious of his own Inability. And as his attempting it is a Proof that he thought the Cause good and justifiable, so is it, that he attempts it as a mere Voluntier. If any of the late Ministry had thought a Vindication necessary, they certainly would have employ'd an abler Pen; or had they been made acquainted with even this Attempt in their Favour, they would have furnish'd other Materials than appear to have been in this Author's Hands. But the Truth is, he wrote without Instruction, because

be thou
Man in
to the
which

He l
be ende
will ha
ing con
take Aa
be thoug
he never
last was
whilst
Had it
been sug
late gre
pacitate
thought
fluence t
serving
the Gov

'Tis n
already
with reg
noble Pe
page of
Regard
of it, w
Intent t
who are
unnatur
mongst u

he thought it unnecessary to have Recourse to any Man in the stating Facts, which are now known to the whole People, or in making Observations, which arise naturally from the Subject.

He hopes that none of the Great Men, whom he endeavours to rescue from Misrepresentation, will have the worse Opinion of him for not having consulted or paid Court to any Man. To take Advice where no Difficulty appear'd to him, he thought needless; and paying Court was what he never practis'd, nor was used to. And this last was his Reason for not publishing this Piece whilst the late Administration subsisted intire. Had it appeared in those Days, it might have been suggested that Court had been paid to a late great Minister. But now that he is incapacitated to gratify or awe, it cannot possibly be thought that the Author was under any other Influence than that of a Consciousness that he was serving his Country, in setting the Conduct of the Government in a true and proper Light.

'Tis not doubted that the National Enquiry already set on foot will prove a full Justification, with regard to our Domestic Transactions, of the noble Peer, whose Name is mentioned in the Title-page of this Work; and as for his Conduct with regard to Foreign, 'tis hoped what is said here of it, will justify him to all that read with an Intent to be informed and set right. As for those who are resolved not to be convinced, if any such unnatural, unreasonable Creatures there are amongst us, a Man must be as unreasonable as they,

they, that would expect to make any Impression upon them.

As the Mention made of the aforesaid Nobleman's Name, is without his Consent or Privity, the Author hopes, that his Intention to serve him in undeceiving the Prejudiced, will atone for the Liberty he has taken.

C

C

Late

S I

T

ling to
gives n
Nature
It gives
Sake pa
still to
ther so
so happ
vince y
owing n
ciples w
than an
I am se
set my
Friend
Country
city.

T H E



THE
CONDUCT
OF THE
Late ADMINISTRATION, &c.

S I R,

THOUGH the Familiarity you once honour'd me with, has been discontinued for many Years past, I am willing to hope you will think with me, that it gives me a Title to such Freedom as the Nature of the Subject I am to treat of requires. It gives me a sincere Concern, and for your Sake particularly, that the same Reasons seem still to subsist, which sever'd us from each other so long ago ; and heartily wish I may be so happy in this Address to you, as to convince you that the Breach between us was owing more to your Departure from the *Principles* we both of us adhered to at that time, than any Variation in my Conduct ever since. I am sensible of the Difficulty of the Task I set my self ; but however arduous it be, my Friendship for you, and my Regard for my Country, induce me to undertake it with Alacrity.

A 2

I shall

I shall not, like some whom your Separation had incens'd, attempt to impeach your *Gratitude* to your *Prince*, or *Sincerity* to your *intimate Friends*; my Friendship for you won't admit of Satire or Obloquy. If I can't reason you into a good Opinion of *those* whom you held for many Years in the *highest Esteem*, I shall not therefore treat you bitterly or indecently. I shall not believe with many, and even with some who affect to be thought enlisted under your own Banner, that in the beginning, the quitting your *old Friends* was owing more to *Pique* and *Ambition*, than to any real Dislike of their *Measures*; nor that your unwearied *Opposition* ever since was founded solely on an *envious Aversion* to one *Great Man*, whom you may have thought yourself intitled to equal at least, if not to exceed in Power and the Confidence of your Prince. I shall chuse rather to believe that your Separation at first, and your continued Disapprobation ever since, are the Result of an Opinion, unwarrantable as I think it to be, which you form'd to your self, that the Measures of the Administration were such as tended to subvert the Constitution of your Country, and that you opposed the Court for that Reason only.

It must be admitted however, that what I am willing to call your *Zeal* for your Country, has carry'd you in this Contest far greater Lengths than was consistent with that Candour
and

and Politeness so observable in you on other Occasions ; and very much farther than, I verily believe, you yourself intended at your first setting out. But I am fond to impute these Excesses rather to the *ill Hands* you fell into after your *Separation*, than your own natural Disposition.

These secret *Enemies* to both your *Principles* and mine, seiz'd the Opportunity furnish'd by your *Disgust*, and spared no Pains to widen the Breach almost beyond all Possibility of being heal'd. These Sons of Feud, who build upon sowing Discord and Discontent, found their Account in detaching a Gentleman of your Fortune and Ability from the *Minister*, who, they would persuade you, design'd to make you subservient to his own private Views of Power and Influence. They did not fail to add Fuel of various kinds to your natural honest Fire, which had still remain'd such, had not these insinuating *Craftsmen* found means to direct it to an Use as injurious to the Community in General, as I am afraid it will be to Yourself in the End. They have left you few Intervals of cool Reflexion, hurrying you from one *Extreme* to another, till what was at first perhaps the Result of your Reason, became in Length of Time quite another Thing: Such is the Consequence of a vicious Habit-----

These, Sir are the Misfortunes, these the dangerous *Associates* I would fain rescue you from. The Design is laudable ; and let me
add,

add, 'tis virtuous, when directed as mine is, by the Remains of an unfeigned Friendship for an old and worthy Acquaintance, unwarily *seduced* from his own and the real Interest of his Country. However I may succeed, I assure myself of your Pardon, and, if you be not much alter'd, of your Thanks also, for an Attempt founded chiefly on a zealous Regard for your Person and Merit.

So good an Opinion I still conceive of your Understanding, that I will suppose you as truly as ever a Friend to our *Constitution* as established by the late happy *Revolution*, notwithstanding the ensnaring Arts of your *New Allies* to alter your Way of Thinking. Taking then your Steadiness in this virtuous Principle for granted, I shall endeavour to convince you of the *Injustice* as well as *Unreasonableness* of your constant *Opposition* to the Measures of the Ministry, who, in my Opinion, far from meriting your Dislike or Disapprobation, deserve all the Praise and Encomium which you and every honest *Briton* can bestow.

As Human Nature is incapable of Perfection, you can't expect them or any other Set of Men in the World exempt from Error. They don't pretend to Infallibility any more than those who went before them; but if we can make it appear that they have been guilty of fewer Mistakes of Moment than those, you will agree with me, that they have not deserved that Weight of Reproach which
your

your present *Associates* have endeavour'd to fix upon them.

Here I might enumerate a long String of great and capital Errors committed by the several Administrations in King *William's* Reign, and that of Queen *Anne*; but as I have no Intention, nor am under a Necessity of Criminating others, in order to acquit those whose Defence I have undertaken, I shall mention only one single *Error*, tho' there were many, in each of the aforesaid Administrations, which are fresh in most Men's Memories, and even in yours, Sir, young and vigorous as you are as yet. . You will, I doubt not, easily guess that I mean the *Partition-Treaty* in King *William's* Reign; the Non-acceptance of the Proposals of *France* in 1709 at *Gertruydenberg*; and the Closing with that *Crown* in 1712 at *Utrecht*. These, Sir, were such Mistakes in the Administrations of those Days, as are scarce ever to be retriev'd; they are such as bear no Proportion to any or all the Errors put together of the present *Administration*; and yet the Nation was not spirited up against the Ministers of those Days, as you know, Sir, has been done with uncommon Address and Rancour since your Separation. But there was no proscribed abandon'd *B-----ke* in those less vicious Times, to lay a deep Train for unhinging our Constitution. There were no premeditated *Designs* to overturn the *Establishment* by throwing the Nation into Confusion, alienating

nating the Affections of the Subject, and calumniating the ablest and faithfullest of the *Servants* of the Crown.

As the whole Artillery of these our *secret Enemies* has been chiefly pointed at *One Gentleman* in the Administration, I shall for once, to humour them, suppose this *Great Man* chief Agent under the *Royal Direction*; and as such, confine my self principally to his Justification in *Essentials*, without attempting to answer all that fetid Litany of *Calumny* and *Scurrility* with which the *Press* abounded ever since you thought proper to quit your old Friends. Detractors are as much below my Notice, as the *Minister* is above their Reach or Malice. The bitterest of his *Enemies* must allow him to be steady and faithful in his Friendship, whilst those he honours with it act consistent with that Zeal and Duty required by, and due to the August Prince he serves. When they swerve from that sacred *Duty*, he is obliged in Conscience, in Honour, tho' it may be with Reluctance, not only to drop his Correspondence, but withdraw his Regard.

Let us view this great injur'd Man in the Plenitude of Power: Who ever, in the like Situation before him, has shewn less Pride or Arrogance, or more Frankness or Affability? Who less Severity towards those that have made the basest Attempts upon his Character? Who has permitted so great Liberties in every audacious, seditious Shape, tho' warranted to
punish

punish
View
make
Who
Arrog
before
Confid
do?
Debat
these
Power
his Re
of his
Infinu
of the
Master
I may
his En
a Series
weak a
Does
mon sh
that co
gainst
of activ
they at
in ever
or inver
thors an
lels, in
Prince,
not in c

punish by the known Laws of the Land?-----
 View him in another Light : Who has or does
 make so conspicuous a Figure in the *Senate*?
 Who so intirely free from that over-bearing
 Arrogance so distinguishable in many Ministers
 before him, that had not so amply enjoy'd the
 Confidence of the Prince, as he is supposed to
 do? Who more cool or engaging in Publick
 Debates? or who has been equal to him on
 these National Occasions before he was in
 Power? Power added not to the Strength of
 his Reasoning, or to the Force or Persuasion
 of his native Eloquence. Vain have been the
 Insinuations of his Incapacity for the Discharge
 of the high Trust reposed in him by his Royal
 Master. A regular and uniform Conduct, and
 I may say, notwithstanding the Suggestions of
 his Enemies, a successful Administration for
 a Series of Years, render all such Insinuations
 weak and ridiculous.

Does it not require, think you, an uncommon share of Understanding to be able to stem that continued Torrent of *Opposition* raised against him by your self, Sir, and all your *Posse* of active and implacable *Opponents*? Have not they attempted his Ruin under all Disguises, in every Form the Art of Man could imagine or invent? Have not they ran sack'd all Authors ancient and modern, for invidious Parallels, in order to render him obnoxious to his Prince, and odious to the People? Have they not in every Shape sought to distress him, by

B

clogging

clogging his Measures and sinking his Credit as well with Foreigners as his own Fellow-Subjects? What was it, pray, preserved him midst so much Danger, big with Destruction? Was it not, next to that all-just *Providence* who never abandons the *Innocent*, a strong and solid *Understanding*; an *Understanding* that must always support him in the Continuance of that *Power* to which it had helped him to arrive, whilst Party-Rage admits of wise and moderate Counsels; an *Understanding* he has most unweariedly and usefully employed for the Preservation of our *Constitution*, founded upon that glorious *Revolution*, which is now become the Basis of all our Rights, Liberty and Happiness?-----By this we shall try him; by this let him stand or fall.

You will agree with me, that the Frame of our *Constitution* was in some measure alter'd by the *Revolution*; and that most or all the Blood and Treasure exhausted in our late Wars, were purposely employ'd to preserve this new-modell'd Establishment, by keeping out the *Person* pretending a Right to the Crown, or for opposing the Views of all such *Powers* as seem'd inclined to support that pretended Right. The Accession of the present *Royal Family* is a Consequence of the same *Revolution*; and I am persuaded you will think with me, that the invaluable Blessings of our *Religion* and *Freedom*, the happy Fruits of this new Frame of Government, would have been

precarious

preca
Guar
Relig
augu
must

Bu
Crow
are n
strain
fluenc
cheris
been
Cruel
no m
woul
reason
impos
and

some
affect
that
so ab

He
Britij
must
ster c
volunt
have
as w
Prete
tendin
Royal

precarious without these illustrious *Protestant Guardians*. The Perpetuity of our *Liberties*, Religious and Civil, and that of the present august Family are so interwoven, that they must sink or subsist together.

But when the late King accepted of the Crown in virtue of the Act of Settlement, we are not to suppose that he intended to be restrained from maintaining his Interest and Influence in *Germany*, nor from protecting and cherishing his Subjects there. This would have been a Hardship, it would have been an oblique Cruelty, which, I assure my self, you would no more insist upon in this Reign, than you would connive at it in that. It would be unreasonable, it would be unjust, it would be impolitic with regard to these Kingdoms; and notwithstanding the desperate Lengths some People have gone in *Disrespect* and *Disaffection*, I will still have the Charity to think that they never aim'd at any thing so unjust, so absurd as this.

Here then are two essential Points, which a *British* Minister must never lose sight of; he must have them constantly in view. A Minister can never act up to the Spirit of the *Revolution*, nor answer the Ends of it, unless he have a constant Eye to the defeating all secret as well as open Attempts in favour of the *Pretender*, and the supporting, and even extending the Power and Influence of our present Royal Family in *Germany*. They are Points

so absolutely necessary towards strengthening the *Protestant* Interest, and preserving all that's dear to us, that I assure my self of your hearty Concurrence in the Maintenance of them.

Can it be so much as thought, much less expected, that our Kings of the present Royal Family should not expect from us a willing Assistance in maintaining them in their Rights and Possessions abroad, at least so far as it may be consistent or not incompatible with the Interest of these Kingdoms? I won't doubt that you are at this time, as you were before your *Separation*, of this Opinion, as well from a Motive of Justice, as from a Sense you have of the Necessity of invigorating a declining *Protestant* Interest on the Continent, as the most assured Bulwark against Attempts upon our own Religion and Liberties here at home.

The King, in quality of Elector, can have few or no Disputes with an Emperor, or the other Princes of the Empire; or indeed with any other Powers in *Europe*. Therefore as all his Difficulties in that part of the World always must arise from his ruling over us, we are obliged as much in *Justice*, as in Maintenance of the common *Protestant* Interest, to support him against all Infringements and Invasions of his Rights and Dominions.

Has it not been the constant Measure of our Politics ever since the *Reformation*, to support the *Protestant* Interest all over *Europe*, as absolutely necessary for cherishing and preserving

its

its happy Fruits in these Nations? Have we not, to this glorious End, assisted the *Dutch* to shake off the Yoke of *Spain*? Have we not, for this virtuous Purpose, aided the *Rochellers* and other *Protestants* of *France*? Have we not with the same salutary View supported the *Danes* and *Swedes*, and many other *Northern* Nations in their Turns? And shall we now deviate from the wise and religious Maxims of our Ancestors? Shall we not observe them in Maintenance of the Influence of our present Royal Family, from whom we may justly hope, and more firmly rely for Support, in case of *Danger*, than from any other *Protestant* Power in the World? His late Majesty's Acquisition of the Dutchies of *Bremen* and *Verden* render his Royal Heirs, in quality of Electors, more useful to *Great Britain* than all other *Protestant* Allies.

We may perceive in the Instance of King *James I.* and his Son-in-Law the Elected King of *Bohemia*, how fatal the Inobservation of the aforesaid Maxim has been to the *Protestant* Interest. Had that pusillanimous Prince supported (as in good Policy he ought, leaving Nature out of the question) the Elector *Palatine*, he had unquestionably form'd such an Alliance as would have maintain'd him on the Throne of *Bohemia*, and consequently have so strengthen'd the *Protestant* Interest in *Germany*, as would have prevented all those Shocks that have since contributed to its present languishing State

State on the Continent. And had the late King of *Prussia* corresponded with his public Professions and private Engagements with his late Majesty King *George I.* in regard to the Religious Differences at *Thorn*, 'tis more than probable such a Foundation would have been laid in *Poland*, as might in time make the *Protestants* a Match for the *Papists* in that bigotted Kingdom.

From hence 'tis obvious, that every *British* Minister must have a watchful Eye to the strengthening the King's Hands in *Germany*, in order to strengthen the *Protestant* Interest all over *Europe*, and particularly in these Kingdoms. And as to this so just and reasonable a Position, I doubt not of your Concurrence, I must believe you will agree with me, that if Sir *R----- W-----* has all along acted up to these Views, he has done what became him, not only as a faithful Servant to his Royal Master, but as a wise and vigilant *British* Minister ; that he has done but what you, had you been in his Place, must and ought to have done ; that the late Earl of *S-----d-----d* acted on the same Principles ; and that all Ministers who would perpetuate the Blessings of the *Revolution*, and strengthen the *Protestant* Interest, must shape their Conduct by such *Maxims* as the present Minister has had in his View ; and that it is morally impossible to act upon any other, without sapping the present Foundation of our Religious and Civil Rights and Liberties.

It
as wo
in the
jesty s
ing h
of th
prove
minis
culate
shall
Dome
been
Cove
hope
Forei
must
succe
of th
Happ
last C
I a
in the
ful in
Actio
ons, t
devise
Hea
Virtu
of the
be sc
bitter
five M

It being then the Duty of all such Ministers as would faithfully discharge the Trust reposed in them, to act as well in support of his Majesty's Power on the Continent, as in maintaining him in the quiet and peaceable Possession of these Kingdoms, I shall now endeavour to prove that all our *Treaties*, ever since the Administration of the present *Minister*, were calculated for these salutary, necessary Ends: I shall in the next Place shew, that all our *Domestic* Transactions of any Moment, have been consistent with this necessary Scheme of Government; and lastly, I shall attempt, and hope to demonstrate, that all our *Politics*, both Foreign and Domestic, have been such, as must always hereafter be pursued by all who succeed Sir R----- W----- in the Confidence of the Prince; and who wou'd eternize the Happiness accruing from our *Resistance* in the last Century.

I am not apprehensive of much Difficulty in the virtuous Undertaking, maugre the artful invidious *Veils* thrown over this *Great Man's* Actions, and the most labour'd *Misconstructions*, that the Malice or Wiles of Man could devise. *Truth* will always find its way to the Hearts and Understanding of the Honest and Virtuous, such as I take the good *Protestants* of these Kingdoms to be. They may for a time be scared by false Colours; they may be embitter'd, and even poison'd, by *Factionous* delusive Men; but *Facts* and *Events*, and their own

own natural Interest, will in the End get the better of *Falshood* and *Calumny*, and render those odious and *execrable*, that had attempted to lead them from their Duty to their Country and their Prince, under the specious but fallacious Appearance of *Patriotism*. I am so satisfy'd of the Justice of the Cause I am an Advocate for, so thoroughly convinced of the Virtue of *him* whom I have taken upon me to defend, that I doubt not I shall be able to convince even You, Sir, prejudiced as you may be, of an Error, for having *separated* from your old Friends, and for opposing Measures founded on true *Protestant, Revolution Principles*; *Principles* you were born with; and *Principles* you all along acted by, till you were *deluded* by those, whose Business it was, and ever will be, to *mislead* you, and all like you, as you once have been, that are Ornaments and Supports of the *Revolution*.

Without casting any personal Reflexions on one of your present Bosom *Friends*, who had a chief Hand in concluding the Peace of *Utrecht*, you will allow that the vast Power lodged in the House of *Bourbon* by that Treaty, has occasioned most or all our Negotiations and Expences ever since. I will not doubt of your Assent to a Fact of so great Notoriety, and which you admitted to be true on a thousand Occasions before your *Separation*. I cannot suppose that you will not agree with me, that if *Spain* and the *Indies* had not remain'd with
a Branch

a Branch of that ambitious House, we should have had no reason for apprehending its Power, nor the Consequences of it, with regard to the Liberties of *Europe* in general, or those of these Kingdoms in particular. I will not doubt neither that you concur with me, that that fatal Treaty laid the Foundation for even the present Broils of *Europe*, remote as they may seem; for whatever may have been the Inclination of *France* to disturb the Repose of her Neighbours, and extend her Limits, she had been in no Condition to undertake either, if her Strength had not been encreas'd by the additional Power of *Spain*.

Various have been the Reasons assign'd by your new *Ally* for that impolitic Treaty; but if he would speak without Disguise, which by the bye I apprehend would be difficult for him to do, considering how many Years he has habituated himself to *Dissimulation*; I say, if this reputed *Machiavel* had spoken out, he would have reduced his *Motives* for concluding that fatal Treaty to *one* or *two* at the most. He would have told us, that if *France* had been quite reduced, as she must if the War had continued, it would have been impossible to bring about the *Repeal* of the Act of *Succession*, which was his first Step for defeating the Purposes of the *Revolution*. He would have told us, in the next place, that a *Peace* of any kind, however destructive, was at that time absolutely necessary for preserving himself in *Power*

C

and

and in the *Confidence* of his deluded *Mistress*. These were his Motives, his sole Motives for concerting and concluding that flagitious Treaty, which has intailed perpetual Inconveniences, perpetual Expence on his native Country. And yet this Cameleon of a *Statesman* has for many Years set himself in the Van of those that magnify'd the least unavoidable Error in the Conduct of others. Gods! that a Gentleman of your Integrity and Understanding could suffer your self to be made the Property of *One*, that had thus endeavour'd to raise himself on the *Ruins* of his *Country*; and who, tho' he fail'd in the Attempt at that time, still pursues the same dangerous Plan in another, tho' no less dangerous Shape!-----How chang'd, how alter'd, how unlike what I have known you!

'Tis probable you will say, as most of your new Associates have done, that the Treaty of *Utretch* is quite out of the Question as to the Justification of the present *Minister*, it being unfair to criminate *Queen Anne's* Ministry in order to clear the present. I own, the Subject is not new; one may say, it has been almost worn out. But its being antiquated is no Reason why it should not be made use of whenever it becomes necessary in order to illustrate Truths, on the Proof of which the Justification of *Innocence* depends. It would be unfair to criminate one Man in order to acquit another, if all the suppos'd Misconduct of the latter did not arise solely from the fatal Mis-

takes

takes
the pr
not to
to bea

The
the Cr
Treaty
Princes
cept th
presum
it was
closest
less our
and ch
order to
the Tre
and ent
great H
that Pr
ter'd in
Treaties
more w
since as

We a
had a c
and tha
the only
Right to
Views.
moting,
of the g
Year 17

takes of the first. But when they do, as in the present Case, it would be unfair, unjust, not to lay the Burden on him who alone ought to bear it.

The mock *Renunciation* of King *Philip* to the Crown of *France* in Consequence of the Treaty of *Utretch*, and the Death of all the Princes in *France* sprung from *Louis XIV.* except the present King, then an Infant, giving a presumptive Title to the late Duke of *Orleans*, it was his immediate Interest to cultivate the closest Friendship with our Court. It was no less our Interest to receive him with open Arms, and chime in with him in all his Views, in order to divide or weaken that *Power* which the Treaty of *Utretch* had left but too vigorous and entire. This reciprocal Interest produced great Harmony between his late Majesty and that Prince, in consequence of which we enter'd into the *Quadruple Alliance* and other Treaties, which laid the Foundation for many more with *Spain* as well as *France*, as well since as before that Prince's Death.

We are to suppose that the Duke of *Orleans* had a constant Eye to the Crown of *France*, and that he sought all Means for weakening the only Prince in the World that had any Right to dispute his Succession, or thwart his Views. We have seen him in this View promoting, at least conniving at the Destruction of the growing Naval Power of *Spain* in the Year 1718. We may suppose also, that the

Stipulation in favour of *Don Carlos* by the *Quadruple Alliance*, was with a View, not only to divert *Spain* from forming Designs against the *Regent's* Power in *France*, but to weaken her by encreasing her Expences! 'Tis not to be doubted that the Duke of *Orleans's* Views on the Crown of *France*, carried him into all Measures that tended either to divert or weaken King *Philip*; nor is it less to be doubted, because it was right so to do, that the late King went willingly into all that ambitious Prince's Views, as the only Means for retrieving the fatal Mistakes of the latter Part of the Queen's Reign.

The Death of the Duke of *Orleans*, and the Birth of a *Dauphin*, deprived us of the expected Fruits of all those *Alliances* we had enter'd into to facilitate the Succession of the House of *Orleans*, which, if it had taken Effect, would for ever have divided the House of *Bourbon*.

But how wise and salutary soever these Measures were, or seem'd to have been to the late *Administration*, 'tis most certain that they were the Foundation of all those unhappy Brangles, and expensive Disputes that had subsisted for many Years 'twixt us and *Spain*. These Measures gave some Colour for that insatiable Thirst in the Queen of *Spain*, of procuring Dominions in *Italy* for her Family without which there was no Possibility of bringing *Spain* or her into Terms of Peace.

or Coolness of Temper. These former Measures, likewise, opened a Way for the Pretensions of *Spain* to *Gibraltar* in consequence of an indirect Promise by *Letter*, written purposely, I suppose, to cool or pacify her for the Loss of her Fleet. The Public has been frequently entertained on the Subject of this magnify'd *Letter*; but it must be confess'd that the Antiministerial Writers have shewed some Modesty in not imputing that Transaction, as they have many others in which he had as little Concern, to Sir R—— W——e. The late King, and indeed most Kings, often act independent of the Advice of Ministers, for which Reason, nothing is more fallacious, nothing would be more unjust, than making a Minister accountable for all that happens during the Existence of his Influence.

Thus were our foreign Affairs circumstanced; this was the Situation of them, particularly with regard to *France* and *Spain*, at the Time that Sir R—— W—— may be supposed to have had any Share in the Direction of Affairs of State; for it was long after the dire Mistakes of the Year 1720 made it necessary to have Recourse to his great Ability and Popularity, that he was in any great Degree of Confidence with his late Majesty. And, Sir, now that I have mentioned the *Direction* of Affairs, and the *Confidence* of the Prince, I appeal to you, who were in the Secret of Affairs, and in the strictest Friendship with Sir
R——

R—— W—— about this Time, for the Justification of what I have asserted, *viz.* that Sir *R——* had not the chief Direction of Affairs, particularly of Foreign Affairs, nor was he in the highest Confidence with the late King, till some Years after he had been called into the Administration to apply some healing Remedies to the Confusions, I might say Convulsions, rising from the fatal Consequences of the *South Sea Scheme*.

Many Instances might be given, even in Domestic Affairs, that this *Minister* held not the first Rank either in Power or Confidence, till towards the Close of the late Reign ; and as to *Foreign*, 'tis indubitable, and Sir allow me to say that you know it to be so, that they were chiefly, if not solely projected and conducted by the late Lord *T—n—d* and Count *B—h—r*, after the Death of Earl *Stanhope* and the Earl of *Sunderland*. I shall mention only one Instance, which in its Nature must convince every unprejudiced Person as it did you, Sir, at the Time it happen'd, that Sir *R—— W——* had neither the Influence nor Power, which it was supposed he had. This is in regard to the legislative *Grace* extended about this Time to the late Lord *B---g---ke*, one of your present Associates and Confidants. Sir, you know that Sir *R——* both in Private and at the Council Board, was against loosening the Hands of one, who, he foresaw from his former Conduct and Ambition, and the natural Restlessness

ness

ness of his Temper, would go any Lengths to poison the Minds of the Subjects in order to disturb the National Tranquillity, that he himself might the easier arrive at Power. But notwithstanding his Disapprobation, and the unanswerable Arguments he made at the Board on that Occasion, he was forced to give Way, as Servants too often are obliged to do.

This Great Man's Conduct with regard to this Transaction, and many more I could mention, puts me in Mind of what the noble Historian, my Lord *Clarendon*, says of himself; *viz.* "that he had often, as believing himself " obliged in Duty, argued in the *Senate* in Favour of many Points, which he had strenuously opposed at the *Council Table*." I chuse not to expatiate on a Matter so very delicate, and the rather, that the Reasons on which Ministers found their Conduct on such Occasions, are obvious to every Man of common Penetration.

If this Minister had not the chief Attention of his Royal Master as to the Direction of domestic Transactions, much less can he be supposed to have directed foreign Affairs of the greatest Moment and Consequence. These, as I have said before, were solely conducted by others, at least whilst Lord *T—n—d* was in Power. During this Interval of Sir *R—W—e*'s want of Power, I mean the chiefest Power, was the Treaty of *Hanover*, projected and concluded to counter-balance the first Treaty

Treaty of *Vienna*, between the late *Emperor* and *Spain*.

As the Treaty of *Hanover* had been attended with the greatest Difficulties and an enormous but unavoidable Expence, I don't wonder that the *Craftsmen* should use every Art, employ all their Address to place it to the sole Account of the present Minister, however sensible they were, and you Sir in particular, that he was not the Projector nor had the Direction of that important Affair. But without fixing this Treaty upon him, they could not with any tolerable Colour raise up that formidable Pile of political Scandal, from whence he was assailed on the Score of *Hessian Troops*, foreign Subsidies, and many other expensive Articles consequential of that Treaty. But Sir, tho' common Justice and fairer Usage was not to be expected from others, determin'd to rise upon Sir *R* — *t's* and their Country's Ruin, methinks another kind of Conduct might reasonably have been expected from a Gentleman of your known Candour on other Occasions. You, Sir, knew full well how that whole Affair stood; you knew how and by whom concerted and conducted; and you knew that Sir *R* — had no other Share in it, than what he was obliged to as a faithful Servant of the Crown, *viz.* to concur in a vigorous Execution of the Treaty after it had been ratify'd and exchanged.

But

But if we consider impartially the Situation of Affairs at the Time of Signing the Treaty of *Hanover*; the odd Conduct of the Emperor, not to call it by a harsher Name; the Ambition and extravagant Views of the Queen of *Spain*, who ruled the Cabinet there; and our Engagements with *France* in Consequence of the Title and Views of the House of *Orleans*; I say, if all these Circumstances be connectively and impartially considered, this *Treaty* will appear in a quite other Light, than it has been exposed by those, by whom, I am afraid, an evil Construction would be put upon all public Transactions that did not fall in with their own Scheme of National Uneasiness and Confusion.

It has been observed that the Treaty of *Hanover* was entered into to check the ambitious Views of the Emperor and King (or rather the Queen) of *Spain*, who from being irreconcilably at Enmity, went into each other's Arms spontaneously, tying themselves down, by Treaty, to the closest Alliance and strictest Friendship. Such sudden and unthought-of Harmony between two so powerful *Catholick Princes*, could not but alarm all the *Protestant Powers* of *Europe*, and particularly those of *Germany*. For considering the known *Bigotry* of the new-allied Princes, their Power to draw all or most of the *Catholick Princes* of *Europe* into their Scheme, and the Likelihood of a perpetuity of their Friendship, should the *Archduchesses* intermarry with the Princes

of *Spain*; I say, these Reasons considered, we are not to wonder that the late King, as a Protestant, was alarm'd, and took such Precautions as were likely to defeat the pernicious Designs of the new Allies.

There happened about that Time a Breach, very desirable on our Side, between the Courts of *France* and *Spain* on the sending back the *Infanta*, to whom the young King could never gain upon himself to be tolerably civil. It would be our Interest at all Times to sever the House of *Bourbon*, but it became so particularly at this Juncture; for should *Spain* make up her Quarrel with *France*, in regard to the Affront put upon the *Infanta*, and by that Means draw the elder powerful Branch of her House into her Schemes and new Alliance with the *Emperor*, 'tis indubitable that such an Alliance must give the Law to all *Europe*, and in particular to *Protestants*, who of all others had most to fear from so dangerous a Conjunction of the principal Catholick Powers.

Besides this religious Motive, alone sufficient to authorize the Conduct of the late King after the Conclusion of the first Treaty of *Vienna*, there were others meerly Political, which were of such Weight, as ought to have determined his late Majesty to guard against the sinister Views of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, and particularly of the former, that had behaved with uncommon Coolness towards the Court of *London*, ever since the Accession of the

the p
Emp
jesty
ceede
his J
Germ
stant
peron
some
nary
ship
sion
nia t
supp
Illand
were
ship,
grate
forgo
Aust
than
er of
T
baref
reful
don
with
he re
of B
and
had
these

the present Royal Family. Whether the late Emperor's Indifference towards his late Majesty, which appeared in many Instances, proceeded from any old personal Enmity, or from his Jealousy of seeing a Protestant Prince of *Germany* become King of a powerful Protestant Nation, I can't say; but certainly the Emperor's Behaviour towards his late Majesty had something very Contradictory and Extraordinary in it, considering the signal Acts of Friendship he received at his Hands from the Accession to this Time. The Exchange of *Sardinia* for the fertile Kingdom of *Sicily*, and the supporting him in the Possession of that rich Island, by destroying the *Spanish* Fleet in 1718, were such Instances of the late King's Friendship, as the Emperor, were not he the most ungrateful Prince of his Time, would never have forgotten. But the Princes of the House of *Austria* were not less noted for Ingratitude, than for a rooted Jealousy of the growing Power of all the other Princes of the Empire.

The late Emperor could not put a more barefaced Slight upon his late Majesty than to refuse to guaranty the Succession to these Kingdoms in his illustrious Line; but not contented with so glaring an Instance of his Indifference, he refused him the Investiture of the Dutchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*, which as a Purchaser and Member of the Empire, the late King had a Right to demand and expect. Add to these the Erection and Support of the *Ostend*
D 2
India

India Company in Violation of Treaties, which essentially affected our *Commerce* to the *East-Indies*, and against which Infraction, the whole Nation here at home made bitter and loud Complaints.

Here then, Sir, were Motives, religious and political, amply sufficient to authorize the Conduct of the late King after the Conclusion of the first Treaty of *Vienna*, had it been barely a defensive Alliance. But if it be considered as an offensive as well as defensive Compact; if it be considered as supporting the *Ostend Company*; if it be considered as striking obliquely at least at the *Succeſſion*, and our Possession of *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*; it can no longer be a Doubt, that those Ministers who had conducted the Treaty of *Hanover* by Direction of his late Majesty, acted as became faithful Counsellors and *British* Patriots. Therefore, Sir, supposing Sir R----- W----- to have projected and conducted the Treaty of *Hanover*, as 'tis certain he did neither, I see no Reason why he may not be justified in the Opinion of all impartial Men.

Let us suppose that the late King had not improved the critical Moment of the Breach between the Courts of *Versailles* and *Madrid* on account of the *Infanta*, and that *France* had been lured into the Alliance between the Emperor and *Philip V.* Suppose, I say, that this had happen'd, as certainly it would if there had been no *Hanover* Treaty, what would have

have become of that *Equilibrium* so necessary for maintaining the general Freedom of *Europe*, and of these Nations in particular, and for supporting the *Protestant* Interest?

Let not the present unhappy Situation of Affairs in *Germany* be brought to invalidate my Reasons in favour of the Treaty of *Hanover*. It is quite foreign to the Subject. The present Distractions of *Germany*, being the Product of Chance, or rather of the Misconduct of the Court of *Vienna* before and since the Death of the late Emperor, have no manner of relation to those Transactions I now treat of, which happened sixteen Years before. These former Matters must be view'd separately, independently of what now is; the Conduct of the Emperor towards his late Majesty from the Accession to the Conclusion of the first Treaty of *Vienna*, should be distinctly observed; the Tendency of that Treaty in the general, and in particular, in regard to the Possessions and Trade of these Nations, should be narrowly taken notice of; the disuniting the House of *Bourbon* by widening the Breach about the *Infanta*, should be attended to; and above all, the Title of the House of *Orleans* to the Crown of *France*; and, on failure of that House, of the House of *Condè*, the chief of which was at that Time prime Minister in *France*, should be view'd in a fair and genuine Light. Nor should the secret Articles in the first Treaty of *Vienna* concerning the

Hanover

Hanover Succession be wholly disregarded; I say, these are the different Matters, the different Circumstances to be considered and scrutinized, in order to judge fairly and impartially of the Conduct of the late King and his Ministers with regard to the Treaty of *Hanover*, which has been painted in more invidious and unnatural Colours than any Transaction during either that or the present Reign.

'Tis natural to suppose that the Treaty of *Hanover*, which by the Way, was *defensive* only, not only alarm'd the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* very highly, but inspired them with Resentment; and in particular the Queen of *Spain*, whose insatiable Ambition was necessarily check'd by this new Alliance.

Our Affairs then, with Regard to the *Emperor* and *Spain*, necessarily becoming thus perplex'd and embroil'd, What was to be done? how was the Minister to behave in so critical a Conjunction? The Interest of his Royal Master, always inseparable from that of his *Country* and the common Cause of *Religion*, were sufficient Motives to induce him to concur in such Measures as seem'd most likely to preserve the King's *Possessions* and *Influence* in *Germany*, now become expos'd to the Power and Resentment of the Court of *Vienna*. And what made such Concurrence the more necessary, and must for ever justify Sir R-----'s punctual Execution of his Royal Master's Commands, in guarding against the Machinations of

of the Cabinet of *Vienna*, is, that the Emperor, ever industrious to thwart his late Majesty, found Means to detach the late King of *Prussia*, though an actual original *Contractor*, from his Engagements with the Allies of *Hanover*.

Though the Conduct of his *Prussian* Majesty in this Instance, as a *Protestant* and Son-in-Law, won't bear Examination, 'tis very natural to think that he proposed some very extraordinary Advantages from his Desertion of the Allies of *Hanover*, and closing with those of *Vienna*. And 'tis not at all improbable that one Part of those Advantages, was, to be supported by the Emperor, in making Conquest of some Part of his Neighbour's Territories. Whether or no the King of *Prussia* would go thus far, I won't presume to affirm; but certain it is, that his Conduct and Vicinity, not only authorized any Suspicions that could be entertained of him, but such Precautions as were taken to prevent being surprized by him and the late Emperor.

The evil Intentions of the Court of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, with regard to his late Majesty's Possessions, both as *King* and *Elektor*, and with regard to our Commerce, Religion and Liberties, being manifested almost to a Demonstration, no faithful Servant of the Crown, no Patriot Protestant, could hesitate one Moment to assent to the enabling his late Majesty to take such Measures as should secure him both

at

at home and abroad. For these necessary Purposes were Subsidies paid to some Princes in the *North*; and Foreign Troops taken into our Pay. For these Ends were our Troops augmented at home, and Fleets fitted out to prevent the Designs of *Spain*, then acting in Concert with the Emperor, on *Gibraltar*, *Minorca*, on our Trade, and even on our domestic *Tranquillity*. And here let it be observed, that the other Allies of *Hanover*, particularly the *States General*, were so justly alarm'd at, and so sensibly touch'd with the dangerous Consequences of the Alliance of *Vienna*, that they augmented their Land and Sea-Forces in full proportion to ours. And even *France* made such an Augmentation of her Forces, as may serve to convince the World, that the Dread of the Alliance of *Vienna*, was not as Chimerical as some poisoned *Craftsmen* would persuade the misled Multitude.

But however absolutely necessary these Preparations were for our Safety both at home and abroad, you cannot but agree with me, that it would be highly impolitick to have acted with Violence either as to the *Emperor* or *Spain*. Conquest was not the View of the Alliance of *Hanover*. It was purely Defensive; and the Intent of the Allies, and particularly ours, would be fully answered, could we prevent the Allies of *Vienna* from injuring us by Acts of Violence and Precipitation. The sole Conduct we had to observe, was to ob-

struct

struct t
of *Vien*
Violenc
tent w
Treaty
Mea
us into
towards
over us,
Admini
which
Death
the Fac
Things
have c
Empero
it in ou
own In
ship wi
would h
tire Ru
above a
Ruptur
other t
valuabl
Thes
for that
appear'
we had
Armam
at that
the onl

struct the concerted evil Measures of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*. To have acted with Violence would be as imprudent as inconsistent with the Letter, and even the Spirit of the Treaty of *Hanover*.

Measures of Violence must have plung'd us into great Difficulties; they would go far towards confirming to *France* that Influence over us, which all the Measures of the former Administration had contributed to; and of which we are willing to get rid, now that the Death of the Duke of *Orleans* had changed the Face of Affairs, as fast as the Nature of Things would permit. Violent Measures might have caused an irreparable Breach with the *Emperor*, whom, as our natural Ally, we had it in our view to bring him to a Sense of his own Interest, and back to his former Friendship with our Court. Precipitated Measures would have plunged us into War and an intestine Rupture with *Spain*, a Kingdom, useful above all others, to these Nations; and such a Rupture could not fail of opening a Way for other trading Nations to supplant us in our valuable Commerce with her.

These, we may suppose, were our Motives for that political Slowness or Supineness which appear'd in our Councils and Conduct, after we had put ourselves to the Expence of those Armaments, which were of absolute Necessity at that Crisis. These, we may imagine, were the only Reasons for those pacifick Instructions

E

to

to our Admirals, which have afforded so great a Fund of Invective to the *Craftsmen*; a Gentry that did not, or would not see how prudent and justifiable was the Conduct of their Superiors. But to vilify and misrepresent was their predominant Passion; and with them, an Administration they themselves had no share in, must be ever in the Wrong, let its Measures be never so Right.

The Event stands an eternal Record of the Wisdom of Councils productive of so great Moderation and Steadiness; for to them, it must be owned, was owing that Harmony and Alliance with our old Ally, the *Emperor*, so happily brought about by the second Treaty of *Vienna*. To those moderate Measures was owing that almost uninterrupted Commerce which our Subjects carried on with *Spain* to the breaking out of the present War: And to them are undoubtedly owing the general happy Tranquillity enjoyed by these Nations till lately, which would have been changed, long before, to a State of War and Confusion, had the sanguine Measures of the *Craftsmen* been pursued. Are not these, Sir, Certainties which carry with them all the Appearance and even Force of Truth? Is it not true that we have prevented *Spain*, by blocking up her Plate-Fleet, from executing or being able to execute her Engagements with the *Emperor*? and is it not equally true, that both *Spain* and the *Emperor* were reduced to a
Necessity

Neces
Recon
fione
dies?
the In
the V
in the
expect
Point
and a
those
the E
answe
as it
Condu
and t
impos
gross
it from
of th
swallo
public
I h
Hanor
single
Rise t
been r
ing th
much
Treaty
the E
War t

Necessity of coming afterwards into Terms of Reconciliation, purely from an Inability occasioned by our maritime Power in the *West-Indies*? 'Tis true, our Seamen suffered much by the Inclemency of the Climate in that Part of the World; but the present War carried on in those Parts, proves that we must always expect to suffer when we would carry any Point in *America*. I am sorry that we have, and are like to suffer much more at present in those Parts than in 1726; and heartily wish the End of our Armaments may be as well answered now as at that Time. But be that as it will, to view with Attention our whole Conduct with regard to the Treaty of *Hanover* and the Execution of it, one would think it impossible that the Publick could bear such gross Misrepresentations as have been made of it from time to time. But such is the Weakness of the good-natured Multitude, that they swallow any Hook, baited with *Patriotism* and publick Spirit.

I have dwelt the longer on the Treaty of *Hanover* and its Consequences, because this single Transaction, not only necessarily gave Rise to most of our Measures since, but has been more vilified and traduced than any during the present Administration. I shall be much more concise in my Observations on the Treaty of *Seville*, the second Treaty of *Vienna*, the Election of *Poland* productive of the late War between the Emperor and *France*, our

E 2
Guarranty

Guarranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, and the late Convention with *Spain*, which I take to be the only foreign Transactions of Moment, with which the Minister has been charged. But before I proceed in my Discussion of these Points, it may be expected I should touch upon one antecedent to the Treaty of *Hanover* itself, which, if credit may be given to the all-wise *Craftsmen*, was an Error in our Cabinet, to which most of our Errors since that Time have been owing. This was the Refusal of the sole *Mediation* between *Spain* and the *Emperor* after the first had been affronted by the *Infanta's* being sent back by the Court of *France*.

I never could see any one single justifiable Reason for charging this Step on the Administration for any Error at all, much less for a Capital one; but supposing it had been an Omission, Mistake, or whatever else *Craftsmen* are pleased to call it; surely, Sir, you should be the last Man alive to charge it to the Account of Sir R---- W----, because you were in the Ministry, and every whit as much in the Secret of Affairs as he when this Transaction happen'd. You must be sensible, from your own Knowledge, that the conducting foreign Affairs was not in any Shape devolved on Sir R---- till after the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Hanover*, which was subsequent to the Refusal of the sole *Mediation* full 18 Months. Therefore, admitting a Mistake in
the

the *Non-acceptance*, there is not a Colour for taxing your *quondam* Bosom-Friend with it: It would be an Uncandidness in any other to make him accountable for what he had not the Power either to prevent or promote; but in you, who were then in his Confidence, and knew his want of such Power; in you, I say, above all others, it would be ungenerous, inhumane.

But to examine coolly this Matter, so unconscionably exaggerated, I cannot perceive wherein our Conduct has been in the least Erroneous. The sending back the *Infanta* threw the Court of *Spain*, particularly the Queen, into so high a Convulsion, that she laid hold of every Occasion for returning the Indignity to *France*. To gratify her Pride and Resentment, for the Affront put upon her Daughter, being now the sole Object of her Attention, we are not to wonder that every Twig was caught at that was likely to affront or pique the aggressing Court. This of the *Mediation* was the first that presented itself. It was immediately seized with womanish Avidity; but they must have been weak Statesmen indeed, who could suppose that any solid or permanent Harmony between the Emperor and *Spain*, would be raised on a Foundation made up solely of the Caprice and Resentment of a fickle Woman, acting not only against the Sense of the wisest of her own Council, but directly against the immediate Interest of her own Family. The
Treaty

Treaty of *Vienna*, a Consequence of this Princess's Resentment against *France*, is an undeniable Proof that there was no Safety in building upon her Passions. By this Treaty, the Emperor's Subjects were to have had commercial Advantages in *Spain*, that no others were intitled to; *Spain* was to guaranty the *Ostend* Trade to the *East-Indies*, and pay an annual Subsidy of about *four Millions* of Pieces of Eight besides. But should it be ask'd, what that Crown was to have had in return for such great Concessions, the Answer would and must be, *just nothing at all*, so far at least as can be gathered from either the Letter or Spirit of the Treaty, as made publick. All this plainly shews, that the Conduct of *Spain* being wholly directed by a weak and fickle Woman, it would be the highest Imprudence for our Court to have gone such Lengths to gratify her, as might draw the Resentment of *France* upon us, without any Hopes of keeping *Spain* steady, or obliging the Emperor.

But to view this Point in the fair and genuine Light, what Interest could we propose in endeavouring to gratify the fluctuating Passions of a silly Woman, by disobliging *France*, with whom, ever since the Death of *Louis XIV.* we had contracted the strictest Friendship? The same Motive still subsisted, that had induced his late Majesty to enter into a reciprocal Confidence with that Crown; viz. the Title of the House of *Orleans* to that Monarchy in

virtue

virtue of the Treaty of *Utrecht*. The young King was as yet a Minor, unmarried and without Issue; and the Prime Minister in *France* (the Duke of *Bourbon*) who solely guided the Helm of State, was next in Reversion to the Crown, after the Duke of *Orleans*, at that time unmarried and of a weak Constitution. So that to consider our Engagement with *France*, and the alluring Prospects in view of disuniting for ever the House of *Bourbon*, by means of the Branches of *Orleans* and *Condé*, I cannot suppose that you Sir, in particular, or any *Englishman* of common Understanding, would have advised the accepting of the sole *Mediation*, at the hazard of losing *France* for ever, without any Appearance of gaining, or if gain'd, of keeping *Spain* one Moment fixt in our Interest or Alliance. But another Consideration arises on this Subject, which is, that the sole *Mediation* was not as warmly sought by the Emperor as by *Spain*. Nay, so far was that Prince from seeking it, that he shewed such Coolness on the Occasion, as not only indicated a Jealousy, but foretold an unsuccessful Issue, should we assume the sole *Mediation*.

Under such Difficulties; under such Engagements; in such a Situation; who, Sir, with any considerable Justice, can charge that Transaction, as a capital Error on the late King's Ministry? But had it been one, as I think I have shewn that it has not, would you be the
Man

Man to charge it upon Sir R-----, whom you know to have had no hand in it? I have too high an Opinion of your Candour to think you would.

We are now come down to the Treaty of *Seville*, and the Alteration in Virtue of it, in the *Quadruple Alliance*, touching the Six Thousand neutral Troops in *Italy*, which has been magnify'd by the *Craftsmen* according to their usual Disingenuity. The injurious Consequences of the *Alliance* between the Emperor and *Spain*, were prevented by the *Alliance* of *Hanover*, and the early Armaments in virtue of it; and particularly our depriving *Spain* of her *Indian* Treasure, and consequently the Means of enabling the Emperor by the punctual Payment of the stipulated Subsidies: But all this was not sufficient; something more was necessary to lay a Foundation for general Tranquillity, always of absolute Use to a Trading Nation: Nor was this desirable Tranquillity, nor the beneficial Commerce attending it, to be acquired without Harmony with *Spain*, a Kingdom more useful in Point of Trade to these Nations than any, perhaps, than all the Kingdoms of *Europe* besides.

Peace and Trade being the Points now in View, since the pernicious Designs of the Emperor and *Spain* were defeated, what was to be done? Pray Sir, say how you would have behaved? Consider the perplexed State of Affairs, owing chiefly if not solely to the Measures of
the

the la
you h
utter
ation
you ve
a Prin
Spain,
out th
Prince
Extrea
ing he
Dange
Nation
altere
vate o
for joi
R—
gard to
you w
of *Sev*
turely
the M
mercia
antece
and th
most o
which
On
occur.
Trade
in a M
tions in

the late Reign and Administration: Would you have broke entirely with *Spain*, to the utter Ruin of our valuable Trade, for a Variation of no Consequence in the Main? Would you venture to have irreconciliably exasperated a Princess who presided over the Councils of *Spain*, and who was not to be pacify'd without this Concession? Would you have driven a Princess of her haughty revengeful Temper to Extrems? Would you run the Risk of hurrying her into Acts of Violence, probably of Danger to the Religion and Liberties of these Nations? I don't think you would. However altered you seem of late Years; whatever private or personal Reasons you might have had for joining in a general Disapprobation of Sir *R——*'s Conduct, and particularly with regard to this Treaty, I shall never suppose that you will continue your Dislike of the Treaty of *Seville*, after you shall have coolly and maturely weigh'd the Motives that had induced the Minister to a Conclusion of it, the commercial Benefits arising from it, the Perplexities antecedent to it, the general State of Affairs, and the Minuteness of the *Variation*, on which most of the Obloquy has been founded, with which the Press has groan'd since 1729.

On this Occasion, very many Considerations occur. May not this *Alteration* to gain the Trade and Confidence of *Spain*, be construed in a Manner altogether favourable to these Nations in regard to their Commerce on one hand,

F

and

and their Safety, on the other? Might it not reasonably be supposed at that Time, however Things are fatally altered since, that it would be our Interest to have *Italy* in the Possession of a People, whose natural Indolence would give us the Advantage of supplying them, wherever they are, with our Manufactures, particularly the *Woollen*? Might it not at that Time reasonably be wished, that these Countries might be wrested out of such Hands as introduced their own *Woollen* Manufactures, indifferent as they were, throughout *Naples*, *Sicily*, and all the other Provinces in their Possession in *Italy*; and who had actually cloathed their own Troops there, with the Manufactures of their own *hereditary* Dominions? I appeal to our *Italian* Traders for the Truth of this last Assertion, and for much more to this Purpose, relating to severe, unprecedented, and unjust Exactions and Prohibitions on our Trade to *Naples* and *Sicily*, whilst in the Hands of the late Emperor. May it not be further supposed, that such an Extension of the Dominions of *Spain*, would hereafter prove the Means of weakening her Power at home, as it must divide it, to support Dominions at so great a Distance from her Center; and Dominions too, which require a vast Expence to keep in quiet? Have we not the Experience of past Ages to enforce the Argument in favour of this Supposition? Besides, might it not have been supposed, that such an

Alter-

Alter
might
lously
in the
might
France
have
TH
which
Subje
I hav
cludin
of P
these
count
of th
For,
view
Time
View
ly wi
ening
to riv
Harr
cess.
Bu
the s
Emp
gain
cular
the I
level

Alteration to gratify the Queen of *Spain*, might, in time to come, awaken the Jealousy of *France*, and be the Means of Disunion in the House of *Bourbon*; or if it should not, might it not prove a certain Means of carrying *France* into *Italian Wars*, which in all Ages, have been most essentially injurious to her?

There are numberless other Considerations, which naturally occur in ruminating on this Subject. I don't say they weighed, I mean those I have mentioned, with the Ministry in concluding the Treaty of *Seville*, the sole Motives of *Peace* and *Trade* being sufficient; but had these Considerations been taken into the Account, I don't think the Argument in favour of the Treaty would be at all weaken'd by it: For, that national Compact should be always viewed blended with all the Circumstances of *Time*, Situation of Affairs, the Humour and Views of the reigning Princes, and particularly with regard to our Advantage in not lengthening out the Opportunity of our Neighbours to rival us in the *Spanish Trade*, by protracting Harmony with a restless and ambitious Princess.

But how little soever this Treaty varied from the *Quadruple Alliance*, so far as regarded the Emperor, this Prince thundered Complaints against it at all the Courts of *Europe*, and particularly by a commissorial Decree directed to the Dyet at *Ratisbon*. In this inflaming Piece, levelled personally at our gracious Monarch,

the Emperor represents our Court arbitrarily disposing of the Dominions of other Princes, and invading the Privileges and Rights of the Empire. This blustering Language, which was usual with the Court of *Vienna* to supply the Want and Force of Truth, had little effect on the other Courts of *Europe*. They saw that the Treaty of *Seville* had no more Tendency to the disposing of the Dominions of other Princes, nor invading the Rights of the Empire, than the *Quadruple*, to which this imperial *Complainant* was himself a Party; they saw him enraged for having lost an annual Subsidy of about four Millions of *Piasters*, payable by *Spain*, only for the empty Honour of calling an Emperor Brother and Ally; and they could perceive the same Leaven of *Jealousy* still subsisting, that had been so conspicuous during the Life of his late Majesty, King *George I.* though the royal Successor gave not the least Cause of Umbrage to the Emperor from his Accession to this Time, unless concluding the Treaty of *Seville* was one; or that his imperial Majesty thought himself affronted, that Court was not made at *Vienna* preferable to *Madrid* or *Seville*. Yet though all *Europe* saw into the Drift of the Emperor's Complaints of the Treaty of *Seville*, and how vague were his Reasons against it; though, I say, this was perceived by all the Foreigners of *Europe*, still did our consistent dutiful *Craftsmen*, here at home ring the Alarm throughout the Nation,

as if al
to *Fra*

I wa
you m
where
Compl

was am
Occasi
ing his
derly
jects.

an Eye
der to

there v
in wit

ill-fou
are dr

ciples
counti

viour
injurio

Wh
ville,

which
gainst

the E
the B

from
princi

substit
many

tual S

as if all had been lost, all had been sacrificed to *France* and the House of *Bourbon*.

I was really concerned, Sir, to have found you mix with the Murmurers, on an Occasion where there was not so much as a Colour for Complaint; where, on the Contrary, there was ample room for Exultation; and upon which Occasion, the most dutiful Gratitude was owing his Majesty for having so wisely and tenderly consulted the real Interest of his Subjects. But the Minister was envied; he was an Eye-Sore to your new *Associates*; and in order to perform your Engagements with them, there was a sort of Necessity for your chiming in with them, be their Complaints never so ill-founded; such is the fatal Streights Men are driven to, who implicitly adopt the Principles of a Party. Pardon me, Sir, for accounting rather in this Manner for your Behaviour on that Occasion, than in another, more injurious to your Honour.

What was there, Sir, in the Treaty of *Seville*, that merited that National Resentment which was industriously and artfully raised against it by the *Craftsmen*? With regard to the Emperor and all other foreign Powers, and the Ballance of Power, it varied in nothing from the *Quadruple Alliance*, to which the principal Powers of *Europe* acceded, but in substituting Six Thousand *Spanish* in lieu of so many *neutral* Troops, for asserting the eventual Succession of the Infant of *Spain* to the
Grand

Grand Duke's Dominions. By this Variation, we got rid of a considerable Expence we were obliged to by the *Quadruple Alliance*, which was, the Pay and Maintenance of neutral Garrisons in the Fortresses of *Tuscany*; by this Concession, we recovered the Friendship, and consequently the invaluable *Commerce* of *Spain*, which had been diverted for some Years into other Channels; and more, by this Complaisance for an intriguing haughty Princess, a certain Foundation was laid for recovering the Friendship and Alliance of the Court of *Vienna*, which was ardently wish'd for by our Court and the whole Nation.

Time has shewn how reasonable were our Views, how prudent our Conduct in that critical Conjuncture. The Trade of *Spain* was immediately recovered; and the Emperor's Friendship, as soon as the ordinary Formalities of a Treaty with the slow House of *Austria* would permit. And what was the mighty Boon we granted to acquire such signal Advantages? Did we grant any one essential Thing, but the aforesaid Variation of Six Thousand *Spanish* in the Room of so many neutral Troops? The Emperor intended, by the *Quadruple Alliance*, that the Succession of *Don Carlos* should take Effect, or he did not; if he did, there was no wrong done to him or any other in enforcing the Execution of his Engagements; and if he did not, there is no Epithet bad enough for him, that had em-
broiled

broiled all *Europe* by a *Concession* in favour of the Son of a Princess, who was not of an Humour to put up with gross Sights and Affronts.

Upon the whole, Sir, what Dangers was the Treaty of *Seville* pregnant with, that could authorize the Calumny endeavoured to be fixed on Sir R----- W----- for having shared in the Conduct of it? The Examination by Commissaries of the illicit Captures of *Spain* in *America*, as stipulated by the Treaty, was all that was morally possible to be done at that Time, considering the Nature of all such Discussions, and particularly of those, where Proofs must come so far as the *West-Indies*. If our Hopes of the good Effects of such a Stipulation have not been answered; if the *Chicane* and natural Dilatoriness of the Court of *Spain* have protracted the Examination of the Commissaries for a long Time, and at last rendered their Endeavours of little use to our injured Merchants; all this can never justify the unwarrantable Clamour raised against the Treaty. For if you look back, and examine impartially the Circumstances of our *Trade*, almost wholly ingrossed by our Rivals, by our being at Enmity with *Spain*; if you will consider our Interest and the Desire we had of recovering the Emperor's Friendship; if you consider also the ardent Desire of our Court to get rid of all such Influence or Engagements with *France*, as may have been contracted in the Beginning of the late Reign; I say, Sir, if these Points are attentively

tentively weighed, the Treaty of *Seville* will be seen in quite another Light, than it has been represented by the vilifying *Craftsmen*. It will be found to have been a Treaty, which was absolutely Necessary at that Time, that had the most promising Appearance, and that could not possibly, nor has it been attended with either Danger or Disadvantage.

It were to be wished that we cou'd have post-pon'd the Execution of the Treaty with Regard to the Introduction of *Don Carlos*, till after the Affair of our Captures should be adjust-
ed; but, Sir, this was a Point impossible to be gain'd. The Court, or rather, the Queen of *Spain*, could never be brought to suspend the Settlement of her Child for so very long a Time as must of Necessity be taken up in proving and discussing so intricate an Affair as that of the Captures. This then being a Matter incontestably true, what was to be done? How wou'd you, Sir, as a good *Englishman*, and faithful Servant, advise your Prince in a Point of so great Importance? Wou'd you continue the ruinous Impediments on our general Trade, and particularly the *Spanish*? Wou'd you postpone, perhaps, quite destroy all Hopes of recovering the Emperor's Friendship? Would you continue any Influence that *France* might have acquired in the former Administration? In short, would you continue the Perplexities and Expence arising from the Enmity subsisting between us and *Spain*, ever since the De-
struction

struction of her Fleet in 1718, and particularly since her Engagements with the Emperor? You wou'd not, I am sure; you cou'd not, Sir, as a Lover of your Country, and a Man of Sense, protract so many real Advantages for so very long a Time as the Examination and Settlement of so intricate an Affair as that of the Captures, must necessarily take up---Here I can scarce forbear asking, why you wou'd join in accusing another of an Error, where there was really none committed; and where, if there was any, you yourself wou'd, nay must unavoidably act as he has done, had you been in his Place at that Time?

As it would be the most glaring Absurdity, the highest Injustice to offer either the late War between the Emperor, *France*, *Spain*, and *Sardinia*, or the present Distractions on the Continent, as Objections to the Treaty of *Seville*; I won't so much as suppose that you expect I should take any Pains in this Place, to prove that it has not, nor in any Shape cou'd be productive of any such fatal Consequences. The only Suggestion that could possibly be on this Head, is, that the *Spanish* Garrisons in *Tuscany* had facilitated the Introduction of the *Spanish* Forces into *Italy* in the late War made by *France* and her Allies on the Emperor in 1732. This wou'd be a Suggestion without any Foundation; it would be one which wou'd be self-condemn'd by the Experience of that War. The *Spaniards*, if not opposed by Sea, have,

G

always

always can, and will disembark large Bodies of Troops in the Gulf or Port of *Spetzia* belonging to *Genoa*. This Port must be always open to them; and as it is more commodious than any other on that Coast, they, and all other Nations who send by Sea, and wou'd invade the *Milanese*, will constantly land there. If I don't forget, they made use of this Landing-place in 1732; but I am sure their late Debarkations were there. But had not this Port *Spetzia* been open and commodious for *Spain* in 1732, and had there been no *Spanish* Garrisons in *Tuscany*, they could have found the same Rout for their *Infantry* which they did for their *Cavalry* in that Year. The *Alliance* of *France* and *Sardinia* most certainly would have furnished *Spain* at that time with a sure and easy Entrance into *Italy*, if there had been no Variation of the *Quadruple Alliance*. Therefore, Sir, I can never persuade myself, that a Gentleman of your Candour will, upon this Score, impute the late or present Invasions of *Spain* in *Italy*, to the Treaty of *Seville*; the Imputation would be as ungenerous as cruel and unjust.

The next foreign Transaction of any Importance, which offers in Point of Time, is the second Treaty of *Vienna*. 'Tis true, this Transaction met with more Favour at the Hands of most of the *Craftsmen* than any other during that Administration. I say, most of the *Craftsmen*; because they did not

not
sister
made
feren
take
of th
Expe
cused
a min
howe
well-c
sequen
you h
of no
Sir, y
the gre
of the
vantag
fidence
ous imp
other A
Treaty
short A
Should
cate Ear
ber than
ice and
ervation
The
tions ma
second
ice, as

not all agree in the same Opinion. Consistency was not to be expected from a Party made up of Men of different Views, and different Principles. But as you, Sir, if I mistake not, and the most sensible and experienced of the Party, did agree in the Wisdom and Expediency of that Treaty, I hold myself excused, particularly in an Address to you, from a minute Discussion of it. You will allow me however, to put you in Mind that this wise, well-conducted, important Treaty was a Consequence of that of *Seville*, which heretofore you have been pleased to say, was productive of no one Consequence of Advantage. This, Sir, you did in direct Contradiction to Facts of the greatest Notoriety. Was not the Recovery of the Friendship and Trade of *Spain* of Advantage? Was not the Recovery of the Confidence and Alliance of the *Emperor* an obvious important Benefit? And yet these, and many other Advantages, were Consequences of the Treaty of *Seville*. Pardon me, Sir, for these short Animadversions on these two Treaties. Should you think them too trite for the delicate Ear of a modern Patriot, you will remember that I set out with a Promise of strict Justice and Impartiality throughout all my Observations.

The main, and I may say the only Objections made by some of your Associates to this second Treaty of *Vienna*, (for to do you justice, as I said before, I don't remember to have

heard you make them in or out of the *House* were, that it involved us in a *Guarranty* of the Emperor's hereditary Dominions; and that it might, and ought to have been made previous to the Treaty of *Seville*. Though the Objections be frivolous, or rather intirely without Weight; though, Sir, they have not been made by you, or by any sincere Friend to the Government, yet as they have been made, though it be but by our common secret Enemies, I shall bestow a few Lines in setting them in a fair and true Light.

As to the second of these vague Objections, viz. that this Treaty should have preceded that of *Seville*; if our trading Interest did not necessarily require the making our first Court to *Spain*, whom it will be eternally our Interest to manage above all other Nations; if this, I say, had not alone justified our treating first with that Crown, we could scarce form so much as bare Hopes to succeed, had the first Attempts been made on the Emperor. That Prince was too great a Gainer by his Alliance with *Spain*, to listen to any Overtures that should deprive him of an annual Subsidy of near a Million of our Money; and would he seem to hearken to our Proposals, it would be but to ingratiate himself the more to the Court of *Spain*, and to enhance the value of his Alliance at our Cost. In *Spain*, we had a Lady to deal with, who might be weak enough to insist upon Punctilios and the Privilege due to her Sex.

But

But to be serious; the particular Humours of Courts and Princes being no less to be consulted than their different Interests, there was a moral Certainty of bringing the Court of *Vienna* into a Sense of the Expediency of our Alliance, could we detach *Spain* from her: But on the contrary, it was much to be doubted that her Catholick Majesty's Resentment would encrease, had not the first Court been paid to her. But to put this Point of senseless Precedency beyond all Cavil, I believe I might venture to assert, that Overtures were made by us at both Courts much about the same Time. At *Vienna* they were received but coolly; and at *Seville*, they were not only heard, but embraced.

As for the other Objection, that is, the Guarranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, in order to judge of it impartially, you will give me leave, Sir, to insist that you take not the present unhappy Situation of Affairs in *Germany* into your Consideration of this Point. Matters that have happened since the late Emperor's Death have no kind of Relation to the Point at present in Debate. The Circumstance of Time and Situation of Affairs when the Guarranty was entered into, are the only Things to be regarded. Every subsequent Consideration is quite foreign to the Purpose. The only Questions that merit any Solution, are, whether we ought, or ought not at that time to take the Guarranty upon us?

Could I suppose that a Gentleman of your Discernment would not answer in the Affirmative without Hesitation, I would employ more Time than I shall in proving, not only that our Conduct in this Instance was perfectly right, but that it would have been egregiously wrong had we acted otherwise. It will be rather a Question, why this necessary prudent Step had not been taken sooner, than why it was taken at all? The Wisdom of the Transaction is not, nor cannot with any Colour of Justice be called in Question. It can be no Doubt that it was our Interest to go into all Measures that had the Appearance of producing any Effects tending to the Preservation of the Ballance of Power; nor is it less to be doubted, that this necessary Ballance of Power was not to be preserved, but by supporting the only Power in *Europe* capable, in Conjunction with the *Maritime Powers*, to thwart any enslaving Designs of the House of *Bourbon*. This Power, so absolutely necessary to be supported, was the House of *Austria*. But unless the whole Succession of this House center'd in one Hand, and devolved intire on one single Person, it would become of little Weight in the common Cause of Liberty.

The Emperor foresaw, that not only the Ruin of his Family, but of the Ballance of Power also, would attend any Division of his Possessions, therefore wisely settled the Whole on his eldest Daughter, on his failure of Issue

Male.

Male. This Disposition, Sir ; this Settlement, replete with Wisdom and general Freedom, was what we undertook by the second Treaty of *Vienna* to support under certain Restrictions. As it was undoubtedly our Interest to support this Disposition of the *Austrian* Succession, it became no less that of the *States-General* in particular. They saw the Expediency of it, they perceived the Necessity of it, and willingly joined us in the same Act of Guarranty.

'Tis not doubted that this necessary Step would have been taken earlier by his late Majesty (in the present Reign it was not possible to take it earlier) if the Jealousy and Ill-humour of the Emperor on one hand, and our Engagements with the House of *Orleans* on the other, did not obstruct the good Intentions of our Court in that Reign. But the Case was now quite altered. The Birth of a *Dauphin* and another Prince had varied Things with regard to the House of *Orleans*, and whatever personal Enmity there had been between his late Majesty and the Emperor, it was now quite removed.

If then our guarrantying the *Pragmatick Sanction* was necessary, our whole Conduct with regard to it was right. The Treaty of *Seville* may be said to have paved the Way for it. Without this previous necessary Treaty, that of *Vienna* would have been difficult, if not impracticable. The Queen of *Spain* was pacified by the Variation of neutral *Troops*;
and

and the Emperor was contented by guarrantying his Succession. If it was right to rescue the *Spanish* Trade out of the Hands of our Rivals, by agreeing to the Variation, it was certainly no less so to gratify the *Emperor* for consenting to such Variation. The Emperor did not think himself injured by the Variation any more than we did. And indeed he could not without betraying too great Weakness, it being certain that the *Austrian* Possessions in *Italy* can never add to the Power of that House, any more than the Power of *Spain* can be encreased by her present Possessions there. The Reason will seem obvious to any one who rightly considers the wide Disparity between a separated, extended, and compact collected Force.

The happy Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*, and the second Treaty of *Vienna*, not only enabled us to recover our general Trade and lessen our Expences, but gave us Hopes of seeing a general and lasting Tranquillity. But the Death of his late *Polish* Majesty soon obstructed this pleasing Prospect. Here, Sir, would be a large Field for Reasoning on the Conduct and Interest of the Courts of *Vienna*, *Petersburg*, and *Versailles*, on that unhappy Event, if I were not writing to a Gentleman too well versed in Politicks, to need any Information I am capable of giving on the Subject. As you are sensible, that we had no share in the War that succeeded the Election of *Poland*,
and

and that it was not in our Power to prevent it, I need only to account for our Neutrality while it lasted. Even this would be unnecessary, considering that you, Sir, in particular, and your new Associates in general, never so much as insinuated that we ought to act otherwise than as we did, whilst the War subsisted; I say, Sir, that a Vindication of our Neutrality would be needless, did not the late glaring Injustice of the *Craftsmen* oblige me to it. I flatter myself that you will excuse the Harshness of the Word *Injustice*, when you hear my Reasons.

I have observed that the whole *Posse* of *Craftsmen*, Legislators and Auxiliaries, were quite silent during the Existence of the late War between the Emperor and *France*. It was never, that I can call to mind, so much as suggested in either of the Houses, nor, I am sure, in any public Writings, that we ought to have involved ourselves in a Quarrel we had no Hand in, and which the *Dutch* as well as we look'd upon as indifferent, whilst Conquest seemed to be intended no where but in *Italy*. This profound Silence, Sir, must have proceeded from a Consciousness of the Rectitude of our Conduct at that critical Conjunction; it could have no other Motive. For certainly, the Freedom, not to say the Indecency, of the Orators and Scribes of the Party towards the Administration, and even the Throne, on other Occasions, is Proof sufficient, that this Silence

H

did

did not proceed from a regardful Deference for either. The *Injustice* of the *Craftsmen* lies here : Their Silence during the War, was a tacit Approbation at least, of the *Neutrality*; but their late *Invectives* against that same *Neutrality*, is ample Proof of *Uncandidness* and *Injustice*. They owned no *Necessity* of our taking Part in that War, because in Fact they saw no Danger from the *Steddiness* of our Conduct; but since the Death of some Princes, and false Ambition of others, have changed the Face of Affairs, with those very consistent Gentlemen, all was wrong. If this Behaviour be not as unjust as contradictory, I leave you, Sir, to point out one that is.

But, Sir, to consider our *Neutrality* in the same fair Light, in which, I am to suppose from your former Silence, you viewed it during its Existence, wherein was it blameable? The Engagements of his late Imperial Majesty with *Russia* and *Saxony*, may have been *Politic*; but the whole World agreed they were unjust. And, Sir, let me add, that Engagements and Alliances may be unjust, tho' *Politic* and even *Necessary*. Of these we have an Instance at this Time, that nearly regards *Prussia* and *Saxony*. *France*, perhaps for the first Time for a Hundred Years before, was allowed of all Hands to have carried on a just War against the Emperor, for his Adherence to *Russia* and *Saxony* in Support of an unfair Election of a King forced upon a free Nation. So far then

as regards the *Justice* of that War, we were certainly right in not interfering in it in Behalf of the Aggressor ; and if our Conduct with regard to our *Interest* was as uniform, our Neutrality was undoubtedly right. Here again, Sir, I am obliged to put you in Mind, that the Circumstances and Face of Affairs at that Time, and not the Present, are the only that ought or can with any Justice be taken into the Consideration of this Point.

The sole Weight of that War lay in *Italy*. The Operations on the *Rhine* had no farther View than diverting the Emperor from assisting in the Reduction of *Poland* to the *Saxon*, or rather *Russian* Yoke, and from obstructing the Designs of *Spain* and *Sardinia* in *Italy*. *France* seemed to have no Views of Conquest for herself, and her Manner of carrying on the War, plainly shewed that she intended no increase of Dominion or Power by it. How then, Sir, were we to behave ? Ought we to have taken Part in a Quarrel that was unjust ; that did not materially affect either these Nations or the Ballance of Power ? Our commercial Interest was quite out of the Question : Or if it could be affected, it must have been for the better, since, as I have hinted before, our Trade to *Italy* was cramped and restrained, whilst *Naples* and *Sicily* were in the possession of the Emperor ; and was likely never to be so, if these Kingdoms came into the hands of the indolent *Spaniards*. Besides, the

Possession of *Naples* and *Sicily* rather weaken'd than strengthened the Emperor ; and far from adding to the Strength of *Spain*, they must be always a Drain upon her. Then, as for the King of *Sardinia*, who by the bye, was treated intolerably by the Emperor, every Acquisition of his in *Lombardy*, becomes a real Addition of his Power ; and for this Reason it was then our Interest, as it always will be, that he added to his Possessions in that part of the World. This Prince will not always be of our Opinion, because it would not be for his Interest, to join the House of *Bourbon* : And as he necessarily would join in a Confederacy against that House whenever it aims at too great Power ; it was then, as it still is, our Interest to look on at least whilst he enlarges his Dominions.

But, Sir, did the Weight of our national Debt, did our Circumstances in any Shape allow of our going wantonly into that War ; (and wantonly it must have been, since it did not affect us essentially) did we, I say, declare in favour of the Emperor, where should we have acted ? *Italy*, where the real Scene was acted, was at too great a Distance for us to send so large Bodies of Troops as would be of any use to our Ally ; the *Rhine*, where it was carried on farcically, was attended with pretty near the same Inconveniency : And in both Cases, indeed in all the Operations of that War, our Maritime, that is our natural Force would be quite useless.

It was not, Sir, for a Nation, groaning under Debts and Taxes, which could not possibly be got rid of in the Fluctuations that necessarily happen'd from the Consequences of the Treaty of *Utretch*, and the Measures of the former Administration ; it was not, I say, our Business to run ourselves into an unjust War that did not strike directly at the Ballance of Power, the Protestant Religion, or the Liberties of *Europe*. Peace was our Interest, because it always was, and will be the Nurse of Trade, it can't thrive without it ; and I am sure, without *Trade*, this Nation can neither thrive nor subsist.

But had we been weak enough to overlook our Interest in every Shape, and plunge ourselves into insuperable Difficulties for the sake of drawing the Sword against *France*, sure the sanguine *Craftsmen* themselves would not have advised it but in concert with *Holland* ? You know, Sir, that the Neutrality of the *States General* was as early as the War ; therefore an offensive Alliance with them against *France* was utterly impracticable. Here then, if there was no other, was a Reason that must justify for ever the Conduct of the Ministry during a War which cost *France* an Ocean of Blood and Treasure, for which in the Main, she has had no adequate Compensation.

'Tis not improbable that the *States General* might not be sorry to have seen the principal Catholick Powers worrying one another, and
con-

consuming their Wealth and Strength : Nor do I see why we should be more tender-hearted than our Protestant Neighbours. But to leave Compassion on one Side, 'tis certain that *France* feels the Effects of that War to this Day. In her late or rather present Efforts in Favour of the House of *Bavaria*, one may easily perceive she has not recovered her Strength since 1734.

But, Sir, tho' neither we nor the *States General* engaged in that War, both they and we were obliged to guard against Events. An Augmentation of Forces was necessary, not only to enforce the Mediation we took upon us, but to be prepared, should the War take another turn. And though the Demands of the Parties at Variance ran too high, whilst we and the *Dutch* mediated, for us to hope for Success from our good Offices ; yet I believe it won't be doubted, that our common Preparations and Firmness both here and in *Holland*, quickened the Pace of *France* to put an End to the War, even whilst she was triumphant every where, and might have expected to continue so.

And here, Sir, let me observe to the Honour of the Ministry in general, and of Sir *R——* *W——* in particular, that our Conduct during this War, and soon after, in Regard to the Differences between *Spain* and *Portugal*, evidently proves that *France* had no such injurious Influence over our Counsels as had been often invidiously

diouſly ſuggeſted by this Great Man's Enemies. Our Naval Armaments ſtruck Terror into *France* and *Spain* alternatively. The *French* durſt not venture to the *Baltick* to relieve *Dantzick*, whiſt our Navy rid in the *Downs*; nor the *Spaniards* to inſult, much leſs attack *Portugal*, whiſt our Fleet lay in the *Tagus*. Whatever Degree of Influence may have been acquired by *France* during the firſt Part of his late Maſteſty's Reign, on account of the Houſe of *Orleans's* Title to that Crown, theſe Inſtances of our Firmneſs which I have cited, incontestably prove that Sir R—— neither own'd nor ſtooped to any: And our ſucceſſful Endeavours at the Court of *Ruſſia*, before the late Revolution, to traVERSE the Marquis de *Chetardy's* Negotiations, is no leſs an Evidence of his own Reſolution and Caution, and the intire Independency of his Country.

At length, Sir, we are come down to the late *Convention* with *Spain*, far more memorable, in my Opinion, on account of the Oppoſition made to it, and the Extravagance of the Outcry and Prejudice artfully raiſed againſt it, than for any real Loſs or national Injury that could poſſibly accrue from its Conſequences, had it been permitted to have ripen'd into an absolute ſorn al Treaty.

Conſidering the public Diſtaſte induſtriouſly raiſed againſt the *Convention*, 'tis ſcarce to be hoped that even *Truth* herſelf will be heard in favour of it, with courteous Patience. It was
the

the same with the Excise Scheme, so called, some Years before ; and yet I can't help thinking that both the one and the other may be amply justify'd before an impartial *Minos*, or even a *P-----ey*, divested of his Passions and Resentment. Yes, Sir, I have that good Opinion of your Understanding, I am so thoroughly persuaded of your Discernment, that I can't doubt you concur at this Time, and did then in your private Opinion, in the Expediency of of the first, and general Utility of the latter. The Rage and Tide of Party may have forced you away with the Current of Prejudice when these political Irons were on the Anvil ; but now that they are off, now that *Time* has cool'd them, and, 'tis to be hoped, your Mind also, I make no Scruple to assert that you now view those Transactions in a more favourable Light than perhaps you did whilst Party-interest required your joining in an Accusation of him, who was look'd upon as the Conductor of them. My Reasons for this peremptory Assertion, tho' they are many, I shall endeavour to reduce them to as narrow a Compass as possible, leaving your own Justice to decide for or against me. I shall consider the *Excise*, when I come to examine the Conduct of the Administration with Regard to our *domestic* Affairs ; the Consideration of the *Convention* falls more immediately in my way in this Place.

I readily

I readily admit, that most of the Captures of *Spain* in *America* were unjust; I say, most of them, because it was never contested that some were warranted by the Letter and Spirit of Treaties and constant Usage in that Part of the World, prohibiting one Nation to trade clandestinely with the Colonies of another. These Captures, some being just, some being otherwise, could not possibly be ascertain'd or settled by the Treaty of *Seville* for the Reasons already mentioned. They were left, as of Necessity they must, to the Discussion of Commissaries, as well as our Captures upon *Spain*, near *Sicily*, in 1718. You won't, Sir, you can't wonder, that I say the Capture of the *Spanish* Fleet by Sir *George Byng*, was to be adjusted by the Commissaries, as well as those in *America*. Whether or no it was a piece of Justice due from the Nation, to account for the *Spanish* Fleet, is no Business of mine at present to determine; but I may say, and do insist, that we were under a Necessity at the Treaty of *Seville* to agree that that great Capture should be examined along with those in the *West-Indies*. The Reason is this; that in the late Reign, I think by a Preliminary at the *Pardo* in the Year 1721, it was stipulated by his late Majesty that Compensation should be made to the Crown of *Spain* for the Loss of her Fleet in 1718. I may be mistaken in point of Time and Place, but I certainly am not in point of Fact. And I am clear, as you,
I Sir,

Sir, and even all the *Craftsmen* must be, that Sir R — W — had no Hand directly nor indirectly in that former Compact, which stipulated that Restitution should be made for Sir *George Byng's* Captures. Of this, that Great Man stands acquitted as fully as of the famous *Letter* about *Gibraltar*, which might have been written much about the same Time that the aforesaid Restitution was promised.

This Stipulation for *Restitution*, and the aforesaid *Letter*, however necessary they may have been thought in the late Reign, certainly contributed not a little to all our Difficulties and Contests with *Spain* during the present. But I will suppose that his late Majesty had good Grounds for what he did on these Occasions; and I think 'tis plain to a Demonstration that our Conduct, with Regard to *Spain*, from the Accession of his present Majesty to this Time, was founded on the soundest Maxims of Policy, and the Interest of the Nation.

The Interest of the Nation, Sir, required that we should keep in Peace with all the World, and particularly with *Spain*, whilst it was consistent with that *Interest* and the general Balance of Power. The Interest of the Nation required that we should get rid of our Debts and Taxes, which would be always impossible in Fluctuations, Contests, Confusions and Wars. The national Interest required that not only all the Channels of our Trade should be kept open, but that all Contest should be put an end to,

to, that might endanger the shutting us out of any Branch of Commerce. The growing *Trade* of our foreign Rivals rendered our Caution in this last Instance the more necessary.

We will now, Sir, examine the *Convention*, and see if it was consistent with this national Interest I have been describing. If it was, sure I am it met with hard Fate, not to say with cruel, unjust Usage, from many who knew as little of the Motives and Tendency of it, as they do of the *Bible*, which so strictly enjoins Obedience to the Magistrate and *Charity* towards Neighbours.

As our Interest led us to cultivate Peace and good Understanding with *Spain*, the *Convention* was entered into with these salutary Views; and it clearly appears to me that it would have produced these public Benefits, had not the good Purposes of it been defeated by *Craft* and Noise. *Spain* was frightened from the Performance of her Engagement to pay the stipulated Sum of 95,000*l.* by the Clamour raised here against her Concessions. The Court of *Spain*, in this Instance, was ill advised; they should have risked so trifling a Sum, tho' they were sure to lose it, in order to throw the Odium of the War upon us; and let me add, that we should have not only risked, but lost ten times that Sum, rather than break with a Nation by whom we got more than by all the rest of *Europe*.

I can't persuade myself that the Multitude, who were artfully led to inveigh against the *Convention*, knew the inestimable Value of the Trade and Friendship of *Spain*. I can never suppose, that they knew, what may be proved beyond all Cavil, that we exported, for twenty Years before the present War, more of our Manufactures, particularly the *Woollen*, for *Spain* than to all the rest of *Europe*. They knew not neither, what is absolutely true, that the *Spanish* Trade employed more of our *Shipping* than all the other Branches of our *European* Trade put together. I have had the Curiosity to examine this Matter to the Bottom, and found, from the annual Accounts of our *Consuls* residing in that Kingdom, the most authentic Proof possible, that we frequently had *four* and sometimes *five hundred* Vessels, great and small, of these Nations in the several Ports of *Spain* at once; and seldom, throughout the whole Year, less than *two hundred* at a time. It was common to see a *hundred*, and often *two hundred* Sail of *British* and *Irish* Ships in the Bay of *Cadiz* at once. Two thirds of our *Newfoundland* and *New-England* Trade for *Fish* depended on *Spain*; nor were we less obliged to that Kingdom for the vast Advantages that accrued from our being the *Carriers* of *Europe* during all the Time of our Peace with that indolent Nation. We traded with the *Spaniards* and for them, from *Hamburg*, *Holland*, and from all the *East* and *North* Seas;
and

and to and from the extended Coasts of *Italy*, *Turkey*, and *Barbary*, as well as from *Great Britain* and *Ireland*. We shared in the *Spanish West-India Trade* more largely than any Nation in *Europe* except the *French*, who have the Advantage of most Nations, by reason of their *Linen*, *Silk*, and *Gold and Silver Manufactures*, which so well suit with the *Spanish Vanity*. And even in this lucrative Branch we should have a Chance of equalling the *French*, did not our illicit Trade from *Jamaica* deter the Dealers in *Old Spain* from dealing with us as largely as formerly. They judged, and upon no ill Ground, that their fellow Subjects in *America* were supplied cheaper from *Jamaica* with the Manufactures of *England*, than they could possibly supply them by the *Galleons* or *Flota*; and for this single Reason, our Exports for *Cadiz* of late Years decreas'd, and those of *France* encreas'd. But had we, or could we have put a Stop to the *Clandestine Trade* from *Jamaica*, our Trade to *Old Spain* would have encreased, and the *French Trade* must necessarily have decreased: So that our illicit Trade from *Jamaica*, far from being a general national Benefit, has contributed more than any thing else to the Increase of the *French Trade*, and Decrease of ours. For, from the *Old Spaniard's* Prejudice to us on account of our *illicit Trade*, they have encouraged the *French*, even in their *Woollen Manufactures*.

This

This national Prejudice, I am afraid, is never to be effaced, till the Cause be removed.

Here, Sir, I have given a short View of the national Benefits accruing from the Friendship of *Spain*; and concise and inaccurate as it may be, yet it is clearly perceptible from it, that those *Ministers* who sought to preserve that lucrative *Friendship*, were zealously in the Interest of their Country. Were the Loss of the *Spanish Trade* (an immense Loss indeed) the only bad Consequence of a Breach with *Spain*, it might be supported with less Concern; but if our vast Expence in this luckless War, the fatal Inclemency of the Climate where 'tis chiefly carried on, and the Advantages it gives our *Rivals*; if these Considerations be taken into the Account, if they weighed with the *Minister*, as most certainly they did, 'tis not to be wondered that he arduously sought every plausible Means of preventing an open Rupture. He would be an Enemy to his Country, he would be untrue to his Trust, he would be unfaithful to himself and his Family, did he precipitate his Country into a War, a destructive War, before he tried all Expedients that come within the Circle of Negotiation.

The *Convention*, Sir, was one of those Expedients; and it was such a one, as I venture to say, would answer all the Purposes of the Nation, had not *Craftsmen*, from private Views, artfully found Means to prejudice the Multitude against it. By the *Convention*, *Spain* solemnly

lemnly avowed the Illegality of most of her Captures. This was a Point of greater Importance than most People imagined. It was an authentic Avowal of our Right of Navigation in the *American* Seas, which, till then, had been disputed by that haughty, wilful Nation. By the same *Convention*, the old Wound about the Loss of their Fleet in 1718 was healed. This Heart-burning, the Cause of our Feuds with that revengeful People, was cured by the *Convention*. All Distrust and Jealousy, all Rancour and Malice on account of that treacherous Blow (to use the *Spanish* Phrase) were wholly removed by that wise *Preliminary* for a just, a reasonable, and lasting Treaty. The Captures on both Sides, being once settled, as they were by the *Convention*, there was an End of Animosity: Time, a very little Time, would have effaced the very Memory of what had happened in a former Reign and Administration.

But, Sir, what was it we wanted or expected from *Spain*, that might not have been obtained by a Treaty founded on the *Convention*? A free Navigation to and from our Colonies in *America* was the principal Object of our Attention: Our Contest may be said to have turned chiefly, if not wholly, on this single Point. All our other Grievances, all our other Complaints against *Spain*, tho' some of them were of Consequence, yet, if they be considered attentively, they were trivial when compared

ed with that single Article of the Freedom of our Navigation. What Reason had the artful *Craftsmen* to proclaim, that our Navigation would not, nay, that it could not be secured by any Treaty founded on the Convention? Pray, Sir, why not? What was there in the *Convention* that tended to the secluding us from such free Navigation as we had a Right to? You will allow, that we had no Right to trade with the *Indian Spaniards*; therefore we could not insist then, nor never can, on such a Freedom, as neither we nor no other Nation admits of in the *West-Indies*. No *Search* at Sea was what we had a Right to contend for; and this, I am satisfied we might and would have had by the Treaty intended to be built on by the *Convention*. I will go farther, Sir, and assert, that we might have gained every Point, which the Nation could insist upon with any Colour of Justice or Reason.

The *Craftsmen*, nor even you, Sir, have never attempted to prove that any Point was given up by the Convention. You never have shewn that we made any Concession by that Preliminary, which could possibly seclude us from the free Enjoyment of any Right we claimed or could claim. The important Point of intire Freedom of Navigation, and many others, which could not be settled by the Preliminary, were to be adjusted by Treaty in the Space of eight Months. It was just it should
be

be so, it being impossible to have digested a Treaty with a slow Nation in a less Time.

How many Lives, how many Millions had we saved if we had acted more coolly ; and, Sir, let me add, more wisely ! I must ever think it the highest Imprudence in all those, the Merchants particularly, who had raised the Clamour which broke off all Negotiation with *Spain*, not to have suspended their Out-cry and Complaints till the Effects of the Treaty should be seen. They were not hurt by the Preliminary, as I am sure they would not by the Treaty ; and if they should, it would be then time enough to complain, and act too. For our Operations in *America* would have been early enough had we waited the Expiration of eight Months, which ended in the Month of *August*. And, Sir, had we waited another Year, where had been the Mischief ; where had been the Error ? Our Trade in *America* and every where else would have gone on unmolested ; and our Power to compel *Spain* to do us Justice, did she refuse it in the Negotiation, would rather have encreased than decreased. Her Power could never so encrease by the Delay, as to give her any other Chance of Success in the War, but such as she will always have in the unwholsome Climate of *America*. This Unwholsomeness was certainly the Cause that our Ministers, in our late Wars with *France* and *Spain* jointly, never attempted to make Conquests upon *Spain* in

America. And this same Unwholsomness should have been a Reason with the *Craftsmen*, had they any Regard for their fellow Subjects, not to have spirited up the good natured but undiscerning and unsteddy Multitude to cry out for a War, more injurious to their Trade, their Properties in every Sense, and to their Lives, than any that we could possibly enter into.

I am sensible, Sir, to have trespass'd very far on your Patience by treating the *Convention* so much at large; but as it was a Matter of such Importance to the Ministry; as it was a Matter so extravagantly misrepresented by their Enemies; in short, as it was a Point so little understood by even those who inveighed most loudly against it, I thought it incumbent upon me to examine it thoroughly in a Letter vindicating the Conduct of a vilified, injured Administration. Let this then be my Excuse for taking up so much of your Time on this Article. The next, which I look upon as the last *Foreign* Transaction which can possibly be charged to the Account of the Administration, shall be less dilated.

The Conduct of our Court with regard to the Queen of *Hungary*, since the late Emperor's Death, is the only foreign Transaction of any Importance, which remains to be treated of. This Point being of a very complicated Nature, it will be necessary to trace it higher than his imperial Majesty's Death, in
order

order to illustrate the Difficulties which stood in our way to the literal Execution of our Treaty for guarrantying the *Pragmatick Sanction*: I say literal Execution of that Treaty; because, tho' we have not sent the specifick Succours stipulated by it, to her *Hungarian* Majesty, we have however aided her in another Shape; and have besides done all that was within the Compass of our Power, all that could possibly be done without utterly undoing ourselves, to prevent the injurious Effects of the ambitious Designs of her Enemies.

After the late Emperor had settled his Succession in 1713, he ought to have had two Things principally in view. The first was, to adjust all Differences with such *German* Princes as had claim to any Part of his Territories after his Decease; and the second, to secure the Friendship of such Powers as were most able to guarranty the Disposition he had made. That Prince did neither. We don't hear that ever he treated, or offered to treat with the Houses of *Brandenburg*, *Saxony* or *Bavaria*, on this Head; and so far was he from endeavouring to secure the Friendship of *Great Britain* and *Holland*, that he all along treated the first with more than bare Indifference, as has been observed in discussing the first Treaty of *Vienna* and that of *Hanover*; and the last, he sensibly disobliged in many Instances, but particularly in supporting the *Ostend East-India* Company. Next to those necessary Precautions,

the Emperor ought to have fixt on some *German* Prince for the Consort of his eldest Daughter; and him he should have had elected King of the *Romans* on his Marriage. These Points also were neglected by that wilful Prince.

These Faults of *Omission* alone were sufficient to render the Emperor's Scheme abortive; but his Faults of *Commission* made it morally impossible for him to succeed. In the Year 1716 he went into a War with the *Turk*, which he might have avoided; in 1732 he brought the united Power of the Houses of *Bourbon* and *Savoy* on his back by supporting an unjust Election in *Poland*; and immediately after, before he recruited, before he took Breath after his Contest with *France*, *Spain*, and *Sardinia*, that imprudent Prince forced a second War on the *Port* in Violation of Treaty; and for what? Not for any apparent Interest of his own, but in compliment to *Russia*, a faithless Country, that could be of very little, if any Advantage to him or his Heirs in the Execution of his main Scheme. Besides these gross Mistakes, the Emperor put too great a Confidence in *France*, the only Power he had most Reason to suspect. For some time before his Death, that mistaken Prince paid servile Court to that Crown, seeming to have reposed intire Confidence in her fallacious Guarranty of his Succession.

This, Sir, being the true State of the Emperor's Conduct ever since he published his Intention

ention of constituting his eldest Daughter his universal Heir in 1713, 'tis easy to guess the Difficulties that must necessarily have attended the literal Execution of our Guarranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*. And were it prudent or even possible for us to have faced all the Difficulties which stood in our way, you will agree it would be Madness to attempt it without the Concurrence and Aid of the *States-General*, who were not to be shaken in a Resolution they had taken, of not embroiling themselves in a War with *France* and the principal Electors of the Empire, in favour of a Family, that had for almost Thirty Years before acted every Part that tended to their own Destruction.

The Emperor was no sooner dead, but the King of *Prussia* laid his Scheme of Invading *Silesia*; and he executed it in the Midst of the most inclement Season of the Year, before it could be possible for us to have prevented it, had it been prudent for us to have risked all for the Queen of *Hungary*. All that could be done for that Princess was done. The King of *Prussia* was solicited, was intreated to have regard to the Peace of the Empire, to the *Protestant* Interest, which must be wounded by such an Alliance, as it was apprehended he was on the Point of concluding with *France* and *Bavaria*. On the other Hand, the Queen was pressed to give some Content to the Invader, before he should be obliged to unite with her other Enemies. They were both Deaf, particularly

particularly the Queen ; there was no moving her, no persuading her of the Danger she would be exposed to by her Obstinacy.

What other Part had we to act in such a Conjunction ? Mediation was the only Part we had in our Option. Our Unpreparedness, the Suddenness of the King of *Prussia's Hostilities*, and the extreme Rigour of the Season, were such Impediments as did not admit of our Succouring the Queen of *Hungary*, any otherwise than by Mediation. We engaged the *Dutch* to join in the Mediation ; but, as has been observed, the Ambition and Tenaciousness of the Princes at War, obstructed our joint Endeavours. We not only mediated between the Powers at open Variance, but negotiated with such Princes as we suspected to have Designs upon the Heiress of *Austria*. But still did this Princess herself stand in our Way, and her own Light. She would listen to no Overtures in favour of *Bavaria* and *Saxony* ; she would hear of no Concessions to those Princes, till they had thrown themselves without Reserve into the Arms of *France*, as *Prussia* had done a little before.

This, Sir, was the unhappy, perplex'd Situation of Affairs in *Germany*, when his Majesty went last to visit his foreign Dominions. As soon as he arrived Abroad, he armed, in hopes his Arming would give Weight to his Mediation ; but alas ! the Conduct of the Court of *Presburg*, the unaccountable Wilfulness

ness of that Court broke all his Measures. By his Majesty's Arming in his Electorate to give Weight to his Mediation ; by his laudable Eagerness in favour of the Queen of *Hungary*, he brought *France* and her *German* Allies upon him. The Forces of *France*, *Cologne* and *Palatine*, march'd up to his Door : they were greatly superior to any Force he was able to set on foot to oppose them. How, in such Circumstances, under such Difficulties, in such Danger, was his Majesty to behave ? You will not, Sir, you cannot but agree, that he acted as became a Prince, who could not retrieve the fatal Mistakes of the Court of *Hungary*, by exposing his Dominions to be ruin'd by the combined Army.

Thus, Sir, I have endeavoured to put, not only our Conduct with regard to our Guarranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, but also of the late *Neutrality* for *Hanover*, in a true Light. The latter indeed has no Relation to the Conduct of our Ministry here at Home ; but as it has been made a Handle of for Calumny, I thought it proper to shew the Nature and Necessity of it. As for the particular Conduct of the Administration with regard to the Queen of *Hungary* since her Father's Death, I defy Envy itself, to point out any material Error or Mistake in it to the Time of my Writing, which is the Beginning of the present New Year. More, I think, would be improper on this Subject ; Things, I hope, are not gone so far,

far, but a new Turn may be given to Affairs in the Empire; therefore all that I think decent, all that I think myself at Liberty to say on this Head, I have said with Freedom and Impartiality. The same I have done on all the Points I have handled; and I think I have left no one material Point untouch'd; I mean no material Point which regarded the Conduct of the Ministry in our *Foreign Affairs*. The Consideration of our *Domestic Affairs* for *Twenty Years* back, must be the Subject of another Letter to you, wherein, as in this that treats of our Foreign Transactions only, I flatter myself, I shall be able to rescue the Conduct of the *Ministry*, and particularly of Sir R--- W---, from the Calumny and gross Misrepresentations of the *Craftsmen*, and others, that seek their own private *Advantage* in the Ruin of particular Persons, and a general Confusion.

I am, Sir,

Your most Humble and

Obedient Servant, &c.

F I N I S.

